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In this thesis I examine the causal linkages between natural resource scarcity and violence. In contrast to 
previous research, I posit that scarcity is an inherently personal experience, and thus argue that the consequences of 
scarcity too, should be empirically tested at the individual level.  The available literature has heavily relied on macro- 
level aggregate data, often producing inconclusive findings on the exact causality between scarcity and violence. Based 
on the theoretical work by Thomas Homer- Dixon, I apply micro- level household survey data in a multi- stage 
structural equation model to test the effect of people’s social and political perceptions and attitudes on the linkage 
between scarcity and violence. I find both direct and indirect significant linkages between respondents’ experienced 
scarcity (‘lived scarcity’) and their propensity to use violence. I find that the indirect effect on violence is explained by 
decreases in policy satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy, and increases of more positive attitudes towards 
violence. From this, I suggest that experienced scarcity is ‘politicized’ by respondents as a policy failure, rather than 
being perceived as exogenous to the political system. My analysis supports the relevance of conditional meso- level 
factors, and finds strong differences between moderator groups regarding their propensity to use violence. While I find 
that the highest levels of use of violence in Kenya are driven by political competition, rather than ethnic competition, 
my path models clearly demonstrate that experienced food scarcity is a significant root cause of this violence through 
its effect on how  people ‘politicize’ the experience of scarcity. Overall, the models suggest that the effects of scarcity 
are more complex than previously acknowledged. The risk of violence should thus not be estimated only through direct 
effects between scarcity and violence, but the risk should be understood in terms of both immediate, direct effects, and 
mid- and long- term, indirect effects such as decreased levels of  political trust, lower perceptions of state legitimacy 
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The political success or failure of managing a country’s natural resources can 'make or break' a state. Whether as a source 
of revenue, producer of energy or driver of growth and employment, the ways in which a state is able to manage and 
thrive from its natural resources are a key determinant of stable, prosperous and peaceful societies, states and international 
regions. This has been a recurring theme in past and present policy making and academia alike, and will most likely 
feature even more prominently in the future, as we witness a simultaneous increase in demand for and decrease in supply 
of, many of the world’s most sought after natural resources.  
In this thesis I analyse the linkages between peoples’ personal experience of scarcity and their propensity to use violence. 
I test the case of Kenya using household survey data collected for 2010- 2011. Research has suggested a possible causal 
linkage between natural resources and international and domestic violence and conflict. While popular debate on the issue 
is broad and plentiful1, rarely is a clear cut answer to be found in academia in general2, and concerning Kenya in particular3 
to how exactly this linkage works.  Much current debate, both public and academic, departs from the narrative of climate 
change as the cause for the surfacing of the linkage between natural resources and conflict.4 While the effects of climate 
change are undoubtedly of current and future significance, this thesis will not place emphasis on the role of climate 
change. In this thesis I address natural resource scarcity, rather than natural resource abundance as a cause of violence, 
and moreover limit my analysis to renewable, rather than non-renewable natural resources.5 Unlike previous research on 
this topic, I use a measure of ‘experienced’ scarcity, rather than aggregated or attributed scarcity. In particular, I examine 
the levels of access Kenyans enjoy to food and water.  While ‘food’ as such is not a natural resource and can include any 
                                                     
1 See Gleditsch (2012) 
2 See Collier & Hoeffler (1998), Reno (1995, 1997), Gleditsch (1998), Berdal & Malone (2000), Klare (2001), Humphreys (2003, 2005), 
Ross (2004), Nel & Righarts (2008), Brückner (2010),  Meierding (2013), Koubi et al. (2014) 
3 Witsenburg & Adano (2009), Kumssa et al. (2009) 
4 For an overview of literature examining in particular the role of climate change on the linkage between environmental resource availability 
and conflict see: Brown et al. (2007) Buhaug et al. (2008), Salehyan (2008), Bernauer et al (2012), Gleditsch (2012), Scheffran et al.(2012), 
Slettebak (2012), Meierding (2013) and Dell et al. (2013) 
5 In the course of this thesis the term ´scarcity’ will refer to scarcity of renewable natural resources, unless otherwise stated. For an excellent 
overview of the origins of the resource abundance and violence literature see Sachs & Warner (2001) 
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range of goods, I believe that measuring scarcity at the point of consumption (experienced scarcity) rather than at the 
point of production (aggregated/ attributed scarcity) allows for the testing of immediate linkages between an individual’s 
experienced scarcity and that individual’s attitudes and behaviour which may presuppose violence. Such micro- level 
modelling may prove key in furthering a more detailed and condition- sensitive understanding of the linkage and help 
explain some of the conflicting or incompatible findings in the literature today. In my design I follow Koubi et al. (2014), 
who suggest that “[a]fter all, individuals are affected by resource scarcity or abundance, and it is they who ultimately 
decide to participate in a rebellion”.6 I thus believe that the use violence is ultimately an inherently individual decision 
and so too should likely predictors of violence be tested at the individual level.  
 
Following this approach my three research questions are: 
 Do people who report having gone without food or water report significantly different levels of use of violence 
than people who reported not having gone without food or water? 
 Does going without food or water have a direct impact on people's propensity to use violence, or is people’s 
willingness to use violence indirectly mediated by social and political attitudes?7 
 Do the proposed direct and indirect causal relations between experienced scarcity and use of violence hold for all 
respondents, or are the proposed relations dependent upon respondent- specific meso- level factors, such as 
ethnicity, political representation and place of living?  
 
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 I provide an overview of the current academic debate on this issue. I 
begin by presenting the empirical findings for Kenya, before looking at the effects of mediating and conditional factors 
to the relation between resources scarcity and violence, as suggested in the literature to date. I then proceed by examining 
                                                     
6 Koubi et al. (2014, p. 237). Also see Deligiannis (2012) 
7 This question follows from Levy’s (1995) critique of Homer-Dixon's initial model. Levy writes: “By the time one arrives at the end of the 
causal chain (violent conflict), so many intervening variables have been added that it is difficult to see the independent contribution of 
environmental degradation” Levy (1995, p. 45). Also see Barnett & Adger (2007), Nordas & Gleditsch (2007) Deligiannis (2012), Hendrix 




the theoretical work undertaken by Thomas Homer- Dixon. Homer- Dixon’s work is especially useful in the analysis of 
the possible causality between scarcity and violence, as it provides a stringent and testable framework for both qualitative 
and quantitative investigation. From the theoretical work of Homer- Dixon, I discuss limitations that characterize many 
of the empirical findings in the relevant field today. Acknowledging these perceived limitations I present a conceptual 
model in which I theoretically link experienced scarcity with violence through a multi- stage, causal, path model. To test 
this conceptual model, I propose a number of hypotheses which incrementally explain the linkage between scarcity and 
violence through a range of secondary factors. 
I conclude Chapter 2 by introducing my research design, case selection and operationalization in detail. I discuss the 
independent, dependent, secondary, control and moderator variables chosen for analysis. 
In Chapter 3 I conduct my analysis. I proceed in four steps. First I test the hypotheses in sequential models for the full 
sample. These models are referred to as ‘initial models’. Second I derive a ‘revised model’ from the initial models 
which I then compare to the conceptual model to assess the validity of my conceptual model. Following this comparison 
I subject the revised model to a series of moderation tests in Section 3.3. These models test the validity of the revised 
model under specific conditions. I test the role of moderator variables by comparing the performance of the revised 
model for sub- samples which I group based on conditional factors such as ethnic group size, place of living and 
political representation. Fourth, I introduce additional variables aimed at helping to explain possible difference found 
in Section 3.3. I conclude Chapter 3 by testing for possible ‘interview- effects’. Such effects, it has been shown, may 
cause respondents to answer survey questions differently during the interview than they would otherwise. I test for the 
effects of whether the respondent and interviewer share a common home language and whether the respondents thinks 
the interview is being conducted by a governmental representative or not.  
In Chapter 4 I discuss the findings of Chapter 3 and provide preliminary answers to the three central research question 
posed above. Moreover I allude to possible practical implications of my findings and summarize central limitations of 
my design, empirical analysis and findings.  
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2.  Literature Review 
 
 This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section I examine the current body of research for the case of Kenya 
on the linkage between environmental resource scarcity and the use of violence, before presenting an overview of work 
undertaken examining the role of conditional factors. In the second section I proceed in presenting Homer- Dixon’s 
theoretical framework linking scarcity and violence. The third section addresses the conceptual and technical limitations 
in this field of research today. As I elaborate, much of the research has been limited in explanatory power due to simplistic 
and deterministic models as well as due to data limitations, and has hence failed to trace in more detail the causes of 
violence and conflict and more importantly non- violence and non- conflict. The fourth section of this chapter presents 
the conceptual model and operationalization of the model. 
The chapter closes by presenting a set of hypotheses to be tested in this thesis. These hypotheses result from the perceived 
gap in the current literature and help answering the overarching questions posed in the introduction.  
 
2.1 Resources and Violence: Kenyan and Global Findings 
 
Previous research has pointed towards Kenya’s history of scarcity induced violence although studies have differed in 
terms of which resources produce which forms of violence and whether such linkages are possibly mediated or moderated 
by further, unobserved, factors. Research has suggested linkages between both scarcity and abundance of resources and 
violence.  Dietz (1987) and Mkutu (2008) link drought and pastoral violence, while Kahl (2006), examining violence in 
election years, finds competition over farmland as an influencing factor on violence. Theisen (2012) using a disaggregated 
longitudinal (1989- 2004) approach, contrarily, finds a positive relation between rainfall and violence and emphasises the 
role of population density as a moderating factor. Detges (2014) supports Theisen’s (2012) finding, and for the case of 
Northern Kenya argues that the relation between rainfall and violence is explained through pastoralist violence and 
violence surrounding access to replenished wells during rainfall periods. Congruently, Theisen (2012) also finds no 
support for the influence of farmland availability on violence, lending support to conflict being more closely tied to use 
5 
 
rather than ownership of resources. Meier et al (2007) find a higher vegetation cover to be associated with an increase in 
violence in Kenya for the years 2004 and 2005, while Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), in a cross-national study of 47 
African countries between 1990 and 2009, find a curvilinear relationship between rainfall and violence, with extreme 
positive and negative variations from the average rainfall being most strongly related to instances of violence and conflict. 
This is supported by Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) who find that stronger deviations in rainfall are more strongly 
associated with violence. They further find that drier years are more closely linked to civil conflict while overly wet years 
are more closely linked to non-state conflict.8 On the whole, Rustad and Binningsbo (2012), find that sub-Saharan Africa 
has seen more ‘[n]atural resource conflicts’ from 1946 to 2006 than any other region in the world9. Moreover, Homer-
Dixon (1999) argues that the developing world is especially at risk of scarcity induced conflicts as such “poor countries 
start at a disadvantage: many are underendowed with the social institutions[…], efficient markets, and capable states- 
that are necessary for an ample supply of both social and technical solutions to scarcity".10 
 
Research has also pointed to the possibly indirect effect of scarcity on conflict and the role of conditional factors. 
Adano et al (2012) , for the examples of the  Marsabit and Narok areas in Kenya, find that social institutions, such as 
informal pastoral arrangements and “hybrid customary-  cum- legal”11 dispute settlement mechanisms, can have a 
mediating effect on the relation between resource abundance or scarcity and violence. They also point to the violence 
enhancing effects of conditional factors such as border areas due to disputed or unclear judicial responsibility or 
remoteness in general due to weaker government and security presence to deter violence or persecute violators.12 
Evidence presented by Hendrix and Haggard (2015) in a study of 49 Asian and African cities between 1961 and 2010 
suggests the possible indirect relation between scarcity and violence through volatile food prices and price shocks, 
thereby elaborating and expanding on Smith (2014) who emphasizes the violent potential of food price shocks in urban 
                                                     
8 Raleigh & Kniveton (2012) 
9 Rustad & Binningsbo (2012), see also Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) and Harbom & Wallensteen (2007) 
10Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 108) 
11 Adano et al. (2012, p. 77) 
12 Adano et al. (2012) 
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African areas between 1990 and 2012.13  Hendrix and Haggard (2015) also point to the influence of regime type and 
political institutions on the relation between scarcity and violence through food prices.14  
The effect of resource scarcity on violence however can also be ‘intentionally mediated’ by policy decisions. Boone 
(2011), in an analysis of electoral violence in Kenya in 1991 and 1992, concludes that selective allocation of land rights 
by politicians directly contributed to violence during and after the election period.15 Kahl (2008), as Boone (2011), 
finds that elites in periods of scarcity may manipulate state policy in their favor and thereby actively contribute to 
violence through selective exclusion.16 Kahl (2008) and Boone’s (2011) findings correspond to what Homer-Dixon 
(1999) classifies as ‘structural scarcity’, the intentional, ‘engineered’ exclusion of parts of society from resources.17  
2.2 Resources and Violence: A theoretical approach 
 
It becomes apparent that much of the findings presented under the summative title of ‘resource conflict’ differ 
considerably in what they actually measure as a ‘resource’ and what they posit such measure to predict or influence. 
Research remains conflicting as to what types of resources are more closely aligned to types, intensities and durations of 
and resolutions to conflicts and how these are causally linked.18 
While the effects of resource availability have been closely examined by studies from the economic disciplines, such 
studies have commonly provided limited insight into the ‘human element’ of causality between resources and conflict.19 
Recurring arguments of resources fostering rentier- states or allowing rebel leaders to challenge the central government 
moreover apply exclusively to conditions of an abundance of non-renewable resources such as oil, gas or precious metals 
and minerals. Conditions of scarcity are rarely observed by such studies. The social sciences, apt at furthering insight into 
the ‘human’ element, have however thus far been limited by weak work on theorizing the nexus of interest. Much of this 
                                                     
13 Smith (2014) 
14 Hendrix & Haggard (2015) 
15 Boone (2011) 
16 Kahl (2008), taken from Koubi et al. (2014, p.228) 
17 See following section 
18See Ross (2004), Collier et al. (2004) and Koubi et al. (2014) for an overview of major studies on the relation between resources and 
conflict  
19 Note that by ‘human element’ I mean humans having an impact on the effect of resource availability on violence and conflict, not humans 
being affected by resource availability’s effect on violence. 
7 
 
limitation, I argue, is caused by limited available data at the sub- national level.  
Before turning to a criticism of the work in this field, the following sub-section outlines the theoretical work undertaken 
by Thomas Homer- Dixon and the ‘Toronto School’ during the 1990s. The work by Homer- Dixon is particularly useful 
in furthering the empirical study at lower levels of analysis as it is conceptually not tied to the state level and thus allows 
for a ‘scaling up’ and ‘scaling down’ within a singular model. Homer- Dixon’s model provides a rare instance in which 
the relevance of attitudes and individual’s behaviour are accounted for. While the model has found limited use in studies 
since, I argue this is largely due to the limited availability of data at the individual level for regions of interest. An 
empirical re-visit of Homer- Dixon’s model using such data is thus needed to determine the usefulness of Homer- Dixon’s 
conceptual arguments and model. 
Homer-Dixon (1999) begins by noting that in order to understand the linkage between resource scarcity and conflict it 
is necessary to distinguish different forms of natural resource scarcity. He proposes a threefold distinction of the sources 
of 'environmental scarcity’.20 First, 'supply- induced scarcity', which is commonly a result of degradation or depletion 
of a resource. Available economic theories of conflict and scarcity heavily emphasize this link.21 Second, 'demand- 
induced scarcity' results from an increase in demand for a resource. Changes in demography and consumption patterns 
are commonly named as causal factors underlying such scarcity. Demand-induced scarcity finds great prominence in 
'Malthusian' writing on the topic. Proponents of the dooming 'Malthusian catastrophe' see demographic causes as most 
threatening to both resource quantity and resource management and thus a trigger for conflict. While Malthusian ideas 
have been widely echoed, Gleditsch and Urdal (2002) find that such narrative can succumb to "sensationalism", such 
as the work of Robert D. Kaplan, and "doomsday predictions", such as the writings of Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. 
Ehrlich.22 Homer- Dixon himself speaks of a neo-Malthusian "alarmist story about human destruction of the planet's 
                                                     
20   'Environmental scarcity' is a rather broad term as the following sections will examine. Homer-Dixon (1999, p.48) explains that “The term 
environmental scarcity […] allows us to incorporate in one analysis the three distinct sources of scarcity and to study how they interact with 
and reinforce each other”. I will use the term 'environmental scarcity' within Homer-Dixon's understanding, without continuously pointing to 
the threefold distinction Homer-Dixon makes 
21 See Bretthauer (2015) for an overview 
22Gleditsch & Urdal (2002, p. 2) 
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ecosystem".23 Nonetheless demography, lacking Malthusian determinism, has found its recognition as contributing 
factor on the linkages between resources and conflict in contemporary research.24   
Third, 'structural scarcity', which can be described as 'engineered' or 'produced' scarcity. Such form of scarcity, as 
Gleditsch and Urdal (2002) state, "applies only to certain groups who, relative to other groups, are excluded from equal 
access to particular resources" and does "not presuppose actual scarcity if the resource were to be distributed evenly".25 
This form of scarcity is not dependent upon the existence of supply- or demand- induced scarcity but is based on 
political decisions and intentional exclusion. 
 
As demonstrated above, research remains ambiguous to how the availability of resources, relative to other factors, can 
cause violence or conflict. Competing arguments point towards a range of underlying causal factors triggering conflict 
while resources or a lack thereof are commonly linked as a catalyst for conflict.26 In many studies however, conditional 
and secondary variables were not included in the empirical analysis.  A growing number of scholars has criticized this 
research design, indicating an increasing recognition of the importance of conditional factors. A prominent example are 
the studies by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002). The studies have been criticized as relying too heavily on a selective 
data set and the established correlations being exclusive to the categorization of resource and conflict variables. 
Subsequent studies applying differing data sets and categorization of variables have found conflicting links.27 Ross 
(2004) further notes that Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002) studies may be spurious as underlying variables affecting 
both the dependent (conflict) and independent variable (ratio primary exports/ GDP), such as Rule of Law and Property 
Rights, were not addressed in the models. Ross (2004) points out that such limitation is common in most studies on the 
issue, as availability is limited over countries and time.28  Growing evidence points towards resource scarcity not being 
                                                     
23 Homer- Dixon (1999, p. 42) 
24See Bächler (1999), Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1999) for a literature overview of demographic factors linked to resource induced conflict; see 
Goldstone (2001), Weiner & Russell (2001), and Weiner & Teitelbaum (2001) for an overview of the broader research linking demography 
with security in general. See Kahl (1998) for an analysis of demography as a constraint on Kenyan renewable resource supply and a cause of 
violence between 1991 and 1993 
25Gleditsch & Urdal (2002, p. 2) 
26See Ross (2004) 
27 see Fearon & Laitlin (2003), Hegre (2002), Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) 
28 Ross (2004, p. 338) 
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a direct predictor of conflict or only in interaction with further factors.29 Findings suggest that scarcity primarily fosters 
proximate causes of conflict, such as political exclusion, low levels of accountability, lack of ethnic inclusion or high 
prospect returns on controlling resource rich localized areas.30 
Homer-Dixon builds on such secondary causes of violence and proposes an indirect, two- tier model linking resource 
scarcity and violence. In his model changes in renewable natural resource availability, such as water, cropland or forests, 
influence mediating 'social effects' which in turn can produce violence or conflict. Rather than arguing population 
pressure and environmental degradation being a direct determinant of violence or conflict, Homer- Dixon asserts a 
close interrelationship between demographic, environmental, social and political factors in determining violence and 
conflict.  
 
 In 'Environment, Scarcity, and Violence' (1999), Homer-Dixon summarizes his research on the effects of natural resource 
scarcity and concludes that resource scarcity is likely to produce five social effects. These are: 1) “constrained agricultural 
productivity, often in ecologically marginal regions”; 2) “constrained economic productivity, mainly affecting people 
who are highly dependent on environmental resources and who are ecologically and economically marginal”; 3) 
“migration of the affected people in search of better lives”; 4) “greater segmentation of society, usually along existing 
ethnic cleavages; and 5) disruption of institutions, especially the state”.31 These effects can "either singly or in 
combination, substantially increase […] the probability of violence in developing countries".32  
Homer-Dixon moreover suggests a causality between these ‘social effects’. He explains that scarcity induces 
constrained agricultural and economic productivity, poverty and migration and these “are likely to strengthen the 
segmentation around already existing religious, class, ethnic or linguistic cleavages in a society".33 Homer-Dixon 
                                                     
29Gleditsch & Urdal (2002) , Ross (2004) 
30See Fearon & Laitlin (2003), Collier & Hoeffler (2004),  Ross (2004) 
31Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 80) 
32Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 80) 
33A conceptual weakness in Homer-Dixon’s model is its’ insufficient analysis of the notion of ‘pre-existing segmentation’. While, as 
described in later sections of this paper, ‘ingenuity’ of a society, essentially its ability to adapt to changes in resource availability, is seen as a 
mechanism  that ‘breaks’ or weakens the links between resource scarcity, social effects and conflict, factors influencing the existence or non-
existence of such ‘pre-existing segmentation’ is not addressed or critically included in the models.  
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argues that these cleavages increase competition for access to scarce resources, which could cause sustained periods of 
tensions between competing groups within society.  These tensions in turn would further "reduce […] the interaction 
between such segments and makes non-violent articulations of interest less likely". Homer-Dixon’s (1999) notion of 
competitions is based on Homer-Dixon and Percival (1996) and Percival and Homer- Dixon (1998) who explain that 
in conditions of environmental scarcity, distinctions between "winners and losers" are sharpened, "competition between 
groups for control of resources critical to survival and prosperity" is encouraged, and "resource-dependent groups [are 
encouraged] to turn inward to focus on narrow survival strategies".34  This logic borrows from the theory of relative 
deprivation. Such relative deprivation arises from a perceived 'gap' between people’s expected outcomes and people’s 
actual outcomes.35 However, it is well established that relative deprivation rarely suffices as a predictor of conflict. As 
Gleditsch and Urdal (2002) state, "the deprivation hypothesis significantly over predicts the likelihood that violent 
conflict may occur from grievances" and that "[the deprivation hypothesis] proves insufficient in explaining the 
incidence of such events".36 Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998), in an expansion of Homer-Dixon's original causal model37, 
therefore presume the necessary presence of two other factors for grievances to lead to conflict.38 First, "the aggrieved 
individuals must participate in some sort of collective capable of violent action against the authorities, such as ethnicity, 
religion and class. People must also feel the relevance of their group identity to their grievances- that they are aggrieved 
as a group".  And second, the "political structure must fail to give these groups the opportunity to express their 
grievances peacefully at the same time as it offers them opening for violent action".39 Homer-Dixon further states that 
the experience of scarcity- induced segmentation can erode civil society40, further decreasing the ability of society to 
                                                     
34All taken from Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 96) 
35Ted Robert Gurr examined 'relative deprivation' as a determinant and motivator for civil unrest and violence. For more detail on relative 
deprivation and Gurr's findings see: Gurr & Leggewie (1970) 
36 Gleditsch & Urdal (2002, p. 3) 
37The 'original' Model refers to the initial causal model outlined in the International Security article by Homer-Dixon in 1991. Homer-Dixon 
has since reworked and evolved the model, either conceptually or through the experience from application to Case Models (This continuous 
evolution of the causal mechanisms especially has been the basis for considerable criticism of Homer-Dixon's model as well as applied 
methodology). The model was significantly furthered in:  Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998): 'Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Scarcity, 
and Violence' as well as Homer-Dixon (1999): 'Environment, Scarcity and Conflict'. This thesis will build on the model outlined in both 
Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998) and Homer-Dixon (1999). 
38Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998,p. 11) 
39Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998, p. 11), taken from Gleditsch & Urdal (2002,p. 3) 
40Civil Society is defined by Homer-Dixon as "the dense network of nonstate associations and organizations (including religious groups, 
community- service organizations, and [...] political parties) that mediates between the individual and the state" (Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 96)) 
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"articulate effectively its demands on the state".41 Societal segmentation may also, Homer-Dixon continues, reduce 
"the density of social capital-- the trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity generated by vigorous, crosscutting 
exchange among groups".42 Homer-Dixon concludes that the social effects evoked by environmental scarcity "are 
likely to tear the fabric of legitimized, accepted, and authoritative institutions that guide and pattern social behavior".43  
 
 
2.3 A Bridge over Troubled Waters: Why so much explains so little (thus far) 
 
The study of natural resource scarcity as a source of or catalyst for conflict has shown a number of limitations which 
are likely to contribute to the opposing or incoherent findings outlined in Chapter 2.1, and the lack of robust, case- 
transcendent theoretical models in the literature today. In the following section of this chapter I address both conceptual 
and technical causes of these limitations.  
2.3.1  Conceptually 
 
Conceptually previous research in this field has been limited due to three main shortcomings. First, too little emphasis 
has been placed on the importance of attitudes as a pre-condition and determinant of behavior. Studies have created 
‘black- box’ scenarios where experience (scarcity) leads to behavior (violence and conflict) without accounting for 
attitudes. Second, studies have fallen short in examining perceptions, i.e. how people actually experience and thus react 
to scarcity. Scarcity induced by a natural disaster is likely to result in very different reactions than scarcity induced by 
political mismanagement or vested private interests in a commodity. Third, previous studies have posited too little 
emphasis on the two- fold causal ‘chain’, linking scarcity and conflict as suggested by Homer- Dixon. Despite 
acknowledging Homer- Dixon’s model, many studies have tested only direct effects of scarcity on violence or conflict44 
                                                     
41Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 96) 
42Homer-Dixon (1999, p. 96) 
43Homer-Dixon (1999,p. 98) 
44 Despite his own model, Homer- Dixon has been accused of much of what I am criticizing others following in his steps for. Homer- Dixon 
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and have thereby failed to test intermediary factors in the model in partial and incremental models. Such partial testing 
of Homer- Dixon’s model could have furthered the understanding of causality and pointed to important factors 
moderating the validity of his model. However, I argue that the failure to develop causal models, on the whole is a 
result of limited available data, especially at lower levels of measurement.   
 
2.3.2  Technically 
 
Previous studies have suffered from limited data availability resulting in issues regarding level of analysis, the coding 
of dependent variables and the testing of conditional meso- level factors.45 
Studies have heavily relied on national level approximate or aggregate data46 which has constrained the understanding of 
the link in question.47 By developing models and operationalising variables based on national aggregate data, the level of 
analysis and frequency of measurement were constrained to event data and have thus failed to test  low-level causalities 
and explanations.  
Level of analysis has been criticized by Deligiannis (2012), who finds that “the impacts of scarcities are not inherently or 
exclusively felt at the state level. Scarcities initially affect individuals, families, and communities personally and directly, 
before translated into broader state or societal effects”.48 Deligiannis further states that the “state- level bias in case-study 
research leads to local processes of environmental scarcities and their local social effects being understudied and 
inadequately understood”.49 Such “disaggregated approach”, argues Meierding (2013), would allow for a “much more 
accurate assessment of causal mechanisms that emphasize localized resource scarcity or the impacts of localized physical 
                                                     
(1999) relies on case studies as means of elaborating and ‘testing’ (I chose to use the inverted comas around testing, as Homer- Dixon does 
not provide his boundaries for non- acceptance, neither do his case studies include the possibility of the null-hypothesis being proven) his 
theory. Gleditsch & Urdal (2002), based on King, Keohane and Verba (1994) have accused Homer- Dixon of such ‘dependent variable’ led 
case selection.  Homer- Dixon  and his associates (Schwartz & Deligiannis; Homer- Dixon 2001)  have  since refined their initial work and 
“acknowledge[d] that they cannot say anything about the causal effects, but argue that biased case selection aids in identifying causal 
mechanisms” (taken from: Binningsbo et al. (2007, p. 340)).  
45 See Meierding (2013) and Koubi et al. (2014) for an overview of technical criticism of much of the work in the resource- conflict nexus 
46For primary studies below the state-level see: Meier et al. (2007), Raleigh & Urdal (2007), Theisen et al. (2011), Benjaminsen et al. (2012), 
Raleigh & Kniveton (2012), Busby et al. (2012),  O’Loughlin et al. (2012) 
47See Nordas & Gleditsch (2007) and Raleigh & Kniveton (2012) 
48 Deligiannis (2012,p. 84) 
49 Deligiannis (2012,p. 84) 
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phenomena”.50 In her critique of findings regarding the linkages between scarcity and violence, Meierding (2013) notes 
that many relevant studies have failed to include control variables, such as differentiation of urban and rural settings51, 
and thus run “a high risk of omitted variable bias”.52 
Moreover, commonly used binary event data is poor in explaining cases of non-events. Understanding such occurrences 
of non-events could point to mitigating factors in people’s decision making and to ‘critical’ junctures within such 
decision making that trigger or prevent active participation or violent action.53 As an example, the Social Conflict in 
Africa Database (SCAD) which contains information on “over 7200 instances of protests, riots, strikes, government 
repression, communal violence, and other forms of unrest for 47 African Countries from 1990- 2010”54 has 
undoubtedly furthered the disaggregation of available quantitative data in terms of distinguishing various forms of 
conflict, especially lower threshold forms of violence, such as protests and mobs. However, SCAD remains dependent 
on the event based operationalization of violence. For Kenya, Salehyan et al. (2012) code the 2007 post- electoral 
violence as a single event. They state that such singular coding was only undertaken if the “issues, actors, and targets 
were the same and there was significant momentum linking these periods”.55 While an understandable coding decision, 
it exemplifies the shortcomings inherent to event based (even highly localized) coding.56  For the case of Kenyan post-
electoral violence in 2007, the observable outcome may have been comparable or similar across locations, however the 
relative effect of moderating variables resulting in the observed behavior and intensity may have differed considerably. 
While I acknowledge the operational limitations of any method of data collection, the case of SCAD exemplifies the 
necessity to link and combine various forms of data when addressing the issue of scarcity and conflict. 
  
 
                                                     
50 Meierding (2013, p. 190). The notion of incorrect modelling of direct causes raised by Meierding is shared by numerous recent works. For 
a critical overview see Meierding (2013, pp. 187-189). 
51 For exceptions see : de Soysa et al. (1999), Mehlum et al. (2006), Yeeles (2015), Reuveny (2007), Scheffran et al. (2012) 
52 Meierding (2013,p. 189) 
53 see Deligiannis (2012) 
54 Salehyan et al. (2012,p. 503) 
55 Salehyan et al. (2012,p. 507) 
56 See Harari &La Ferrara (2013) who construct a 1° grid over all of Africa (1960-2010). While this method utilizes a localized approach, the 
data remains event data broken into local grids without testing localized conditional influences. 
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 2.4  Describing a Forest, not just a lot of Trees 
 
 
In this section I present two conceptual ways in which my research design deviates from previously applied research 
design. These deviations are motivated by the outlined limitations of previous research, and the availability of 
Afrobarometer household survey data which is untested in this field to date.  Moreover I propose a conceptual model which 
causally links scarcity with violence, and is reflected in my hypotheses.  
 
I seek to answer the three questions presented in the introduction using an empirical model at the individual level. 
Through this approach I assess whether the application of household survey data allows for a more precise testing of 
Homer-Dixon's stepwise model. Using individual level data also allows me to contrast for groups based on meso- level 
characteristics.57 This enables me to draw more finely the causal linkages between scarcity and violence and highlight 
groups that are most likely to commit scarcity-induced violence. I am able to differentiate findings based not only on 
national or local levels, but also based on socio- economic, ethnic and socio- political distinctions.  
My applied research design deviates from previous research in the resource-conflict nexus in two conceptual ways. First, 
I define and measure scarcity at the point of consumption, not production. This follows in parts the logic of ‘securitization’ 
and the work of the Copenhagen School.58 ‘Securitization’ emphasizes that an issue is not relevant in a security context 
unless someone ‘perceives’ it to be relevant- thereby ‘securitizing’ the issue. I transfer this logic to the analysis of scarcity 
and violence by arguing that, for instance, a drought (scarcity at point of production) might affect people’s consumption 
patterns (scarcity at point of consumption), it might however not. There is no direct imperative relation.59 Thus assuming 
a behavioural reaction may be elusive and could explain the weak empirical evidence found in work based on scarcity 
                                                     
57 Raleigh & Kniveton (2012) argue that “limited availability of subnational data for socioeconomic conditions and sociopolitical 
institutions” is the “greatest methodological obstacle” towards more ‘disaggregated approaches’  ((Raleigh & Kniveton 2012) taken from 
Meierding (2013, p.190)) 
58 See Buzan & Waever (2003) 
59 This approach is not entirely new to this field of research. Tony Allan (2011) argues that conflict over water arises unexpectedly rarely as 
states are able to mitigate the negative effect of sudden or continued water shortages by substituting water intense crops or products with 
imported crops or products. Allan thereby asserts that a localized scarcity of a resource might not necessarily impact people locally as their 
needs may be met through imported water intense crops or products. Whether or not this explanation holds for developing states in which 
people and markets are more likely to depend on local produce and are not able to access global markets to mitigate the negative effects of 
scarcity is not evident and requires further critical analysis. 
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measured at the point of ‘production’. Contrarily, measuring scarcity at the point of consumption ensures that scarcity 
directly impacts the individual and will more likely affect a person’s attitudes and behaviour. The possibility of 
measurement at the point of consumption is unique to the use of household level data and further underlines the value of 
analysis at lower levels. Throughout the thesis I therefore use ‘Experienced Food Scarcity or ‘Experienced Water Scarcity 
as a measure of ‘individualized’ scarcity at the point of consumption.60 As the notion of ‘securitization’ might be more 
closely tied to state or system levels of analysis, I choose to refer to the process by which individuals perceive and react to 
experienced scarcity as ‘politicization’. I thus define ‘politicization’ in this thesis as: ‘The process by which a person’s 
experience changes the person’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviours towards the political system as a whole and towards 
incumbents within or affiliated with the political system’. 
 
Second, I posit that the politicization of scarcity follows similar causal paths as policy and service delivery failure. Homer- 
Dixon and Blitt explain that ‘social effects’ (such as institutional instability and societal segmentation) are causally linked 
with environmental scarcity through a decline in trust and a ‘tear’ in the societal fabric. Astoundingly, the empirical testing 
of the step- wise behaviourist linkages between scarcity and ‘social effects’, and between ‘social effects’ and violence is 
rudimentary, if not non-existent. By conceptualizing the experience of scarcity as a policy or service delivery failure I am 
able to draw from a broader body of literature addressing the linkages between performance- driven political trust, regime 
legitimacy and violence. In addition I am able to model the relation between scarcity and violence as a series of 
intermediary linkages between scarcity, policy satisfaction, political trust, state legitimacy and violence.  My design 
thereby follows Gleditsch and Urdal’s (2002) recommendation of incremental step-wise testing and furthering of 
models, rather than the construction of ‘catch all’ models which are often ill equipped to measure the step- wise 
causality suggested by Homer- Dixon. Gleditsch and Urdal state that “[w]e may ask whether such a high degree of 
[model] complexity is necessary. Can we account significantly better for violence with twenty- five variables than with 
                                                     
60 See Variable section in Chapter 4 for a technical description of this variable. This operationalization of scarcity is influenced by Mattes 
(2008) notion of ‘Lived Poverty’. ‘Lived Poverty’ is a measure of poverty based on individual assessments of poverty, rather than 
approximate or aggregate measure often used in economic literature. I thus transfer the notion of Lived Poverty rather than attributed poverty 
to resource scarcity. 
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five? We have no way of knowing, because these models are not built incrementally […] they do not draw upon a long 
history of theory development and empirical testing for each of these links. We would have preferred to start from the 
other end and build the models incrementally based on empirical testing of a very basic theoretical model”.61 I apply 
multivariate structural equation modeling and use household survey data to incrementally test causal linkages before I 
introduce conditional and mediating factors and test their relative importance on the linkages.  
In order to answer the posed questions I build a conceptual model which informs my set of hypotheses. As I use path 
analysis to test my hypotheses, it is important to define a limited theoretical model prior to the analysis.62 Defining a 
conceptual model a priori, helps me avoid ‘catch- all’ models and ensures that the conceptual soundness of the empirical 
models. The hypotheses thus reflect individual linkages within the conceptual model which enables me to incrementally 
build a significant causal model which is referred to as the ‘revised’ model.   
In the conceptual model I suggest both direct and indirect linkages between experienced scarcity and the use of violence 
by respondents. Regarding the indirect linkages I propose that experienced scarcity is foremost ‘politicized’ by 
respondents as a failure of service delivery by the government. I argue that this perceived failure will increase 
sentiments of political alienation and inter-communal mistrust, and will decrease legal obedience and civil- mindedness 
among respondents.63 This in turn will foster more accepting attitudes to violence and increase active violent behavior. 
 
The conceptual model begins with Homer- Dixon’s work, acknowledging the indirect and sequential step- wise relation 
between resource scarcity and conflict. As outlined above, I use independent variables that measure scarcity at the point 
of consumption, not ‘production’. These variables hence do not distinguish between Homer- Dixon’s three forms of 
scarcity.  The conceptual model displays both direct and indirect effects between experienced scarcity and violence. 
The direct effects are expected to be positive as those who experience higher levels of scarcity are expected to be more 
                                                     
61 Gleditsch & Urdal (2002,p. 6) 
62 By ‘limited’ model I mean a model that is only composed of variables based on theoretical considerations prior to testing. Once I have 
built a conclusive model (revised model) I will then test additional variables which might be relevant for specific sub- samples and use 
moderator groups to contrast differences between moderator groups. 
63 Political trust and attributed legitimacy as a function of government efficiency and performance is outlined by Bratton et al. (2005). Also 
see Hutchison & Johnson (2011) 
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likely to display violent behavior as they perceive possible gains to be higher and relative costs of violence to be lower.  
I include intermediary variables to causally link experienced scarcity with violence. These intermediary (or 
‘secondary’) variables draw from  both Homer- Dixon’s ‘social effects’, as well as from variables suggested by research 
on relative deprivation, institutional trust, regime legitimacy and attitudes towards violence  
Figure 2.1: Conceptual model for direct and indirect effects linking experienced scarcity and use of violence (Note that effects between 






I argue that experienced scarcity has a direct negative effect on policy satisfaction which itself has a positive effect on 
levels of political trust. Higher levels of political trust supports respondent’s perceptions of state legitimacy, which 
produces more negative attitudes towards violence and lowers people’s propensity to use violence. This expected 
relation follows a body of literature on the linkages of government performance, political trust and regime legitimacy. 
Political trust is achieved by meeting citizens’ functional expectations towards the state, such as service delivery and 
institutional efficiency.64 It has been argued that the linkage between policy satisfaction and political trust is especially 
strong in Africa, where tangible outcomes rather than abstract ideals or normative considerations influence people’s 
attitudes towards the state. It has been shown that political trust is a key determinant of regime legitimacy65 which in 
turn is necessary for stable and peaceful democratic governance. This is because legitimate regimes are more able to 
mediate competing societal demands and ensure compliance to a reached agreement.66 A decline of regime legitimacy, 
however, opens opportunities for opposition group mobilization, violent government challenge and defection from 
                                                     
64 For an overview see Hutchison & Johnson (2011) 
65 See Newton (2007) 
66 See Walter (2002) , Hartzell & Hoddie (2001, 2003), Hoddie & Hartzell (2005); all taken from : Hutchison & Johnson (2011) 
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previously met agreements, often resulting in violence or conflict67, an outcome especially prevalent in Africa.68  
2.5  Hypotheses 
 
The perceived limitations in the literature motivated me to deviate from the research design commonly applied in the 
available literature in three ways. First, I apply individual level household survey data rather than national level aggregate 
or approximate data. Second, I operationalize scarcity at the point of consumption (experienced scarcity), not at the point 
of production. And third, I posit that scarcity is politicized by respondents’ in a similar way as service failure, regardless 
of whether scarcity is supply-, demand- or structurally induced. The conceptual model described in the previous section 
reflects these decisions. In this section I derive a set of hypotheses from the conceptual model, which are tested in 
incrementally expanding models in the following chapter. In doing so I incrementally test from the most basic model to 
the most complex model from which I then derive a significant causal model- the ‘revised model’.  
 
Beginning with the most basic hypothesis, the hypotheses are ordered to increase in complexity. The first hypothesis thus 
tests the argument of direct causality between scarcity and violence or conflict criticised by Homer- Dixon:   
H1: Experienced Food and Water Scarcity have a direct positive effect on Use of Violence69 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 1 
I then expand the initial hypothesis to encompass Homer- Dixon’s ‘societal segmentation’. In my analysis I use 
respondents’ reported trust in members of other communities as a proxy for societal segmentation. I argue that low levels 
of inter-communal trust are a valid proxy for high levels of segmentation.70 
                                                     
67 See Hutchison & Johnson (2011)  
68 See Bates (2008), taken from Hutchison & Johnson (2011) 
69 Throughout this thesis I model the relative effect size of the predicted or measured effects as the thickness in the depicted arrows in the 
path diagrams. This depiction is only approximate and not an accurate reflection of the effect size 
70 See Section 2.6.3 for a description of all variables used in the analysis 









Figure 2.3: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 2 
The second hypotheses poses that, first, there exists both a direct and an indirect effect, and second, that the mediation 
effect through societal segmentation is positive.  
Expanding on Homer- Dixon, I model the effect of experienced scarcity to be similar to the effect of perceived quality of 
service delivery. I argue that such experience indirectly has an effect on state legitimacy by decreasing levels of political 
trust in leaders. To test this argument I propose two hypotheses. The first hypothesis regards the feasibility of framing 
experienced scarcity as a policy issue:   






Figure 2.4: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 3a. 
 
Figure 2.5 displays the proposed conceptual model for Hypothesis 3a. I expect direct positive effects between experienced 
scarcity and violence, and between inter- communal trust and policy satisfaction. I expect direct negative effects between 
experienced scarcity and inter-communal trust, between experienced scarcity and policy satisfaction, between inter-
communal trust and violence, and between policy satisfaction and violence. I therefore argue that high levels of inter- 
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communal trust and policy satisfaction deter the use of violence. Both inter-communal trust and policy satisfaction 
however, are likely to be undermined (negative direct effect) by experienced scarcity, which also directly increases the use 
of violence. 
The second hypothesis builds on Hypothesis 3a by testing the mediating effect of state legitimacy on the relation between 
policy satisfaction and use of violence. 
 






Figure 2.5: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 3b. 
 
Similarly to Figure 2.5, I predict a positive direct effect and both positive and negative indirect effects on the use of 
violence. I have included state legitimacy as a mediator between policy satisfaction and use of violence. I argue that while 
policy satisfaction has a direct negative effect on use of violence, policy satisfaction partially also informs respondents’ 
overall perception of state legitimacy. 
In a second step, the linkage between policy satisfaction and state legitimacy is refined in Hypothesis 3c (Figure 2.7). I 
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Figure 2.6: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 3c. 
 
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c form the core empirical testing of my research design of modelling the effect of experienced 
scarcity’s on violent behaviour as an indirect path though people’s policy satisfaction, political trust and perceptions of 
state legitimacy.  
As I outlined in the previous section, much work in the field today has ignored the role of attitudes as a precondition to 
behaviour. To address this limitation I include ‘attitudes towards violence’. I posit that more positive attitudes towards 
violence causally precede the use of violence.  








Figure 2.7: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 4. 
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A final hypothesis tests the overall explanatory value of framing experienced scarcity as a policy issue and thus making 
conflict more likely through its impact on trust and legitimacy.  
 
H5: Once Violence is modelled as a function of inter-communal trust, policy satisfaction, political trust and state 










Figure 2.8: Conceptual model of Hypothesis 5. 
 
 
 2.6 Research Design 
 
In this section I outline the research design of my thesis. I present the data- set employed in the analysis, discuss the 
case selection and method and conclude by summarizing the operationalization of my research design. 
2.6.1  Data and Case Selection 
 
In my analysis I use Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) data for Kenya.71 Afrobarometer is a cross- national regular survey 
                                                     
71 Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014 & 2015) unfortunately dropped several variables used in this thesis 
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series conducted through face-to-face interviews in a number of African countries since 2000. The survey for each country 
uses a multi- stage probability proportionate to population size design (PPPS) and the sample is stratified by Province 
and by rural and urban areas.  The sample size of Round 5 for Kenya is 2399.  
 
I focus on Kenya due to two considerations. First, previous research has identified Kenya as suitable for the study of 
environmental scarcity induced violence and conflict. Theisen (2012) argues that Kenya’s “lack of a large-scale civil war 
[…] eliminates the possibility that inter-ethnic violence is simply a spillover from civil war”.72 Further he states that high 
population growth, dependency on agriculture, limited farmland and a history of inter-group conflict make Kenya an 
“excellent test case” for the resource scarcity and conflict literature.73  Moreover Theisen (2012) suggests that Kenyan 
urban areas run a higher risk of conflict and Obala and Mattingly (2014) note that Kenya shows high levels of “ethnically 
tinged violent conflict” regarding land as well as strong ethnic divisions both in political influence and land access.74 
These findings further corroborate the inclusion of meso- level moderators in the models While case selection based on 
the dependent variables has been criticized as leading to issues of selection bias (commonly thus overestimating the 
attributed effect size), I believe the novel approach of modelling the linkage at the individual level outweighs the possible 
theoretical limitations to be assumed by applying the model to such ‘biased’ case. Future research is nonetheless well 
advised to scrutinize any findings derived in this thesis using other cases.  
 
Second, Kenya and the Horn of Africa Region were hit by a devastating drought in early 2011.75 Recorded as the driest 
year since 1995, the delayed and weak rainy season in the pastoral and agricultural areas of northern and coastal Kenya 
saw crops fail, livestock perish, staple prices increase and hundreds of thousands of people suffer from famine. Kenya 
declared the famine a national disaster and Oxfam (2011) estimates more than three and a half million Kenyans were 
                                                     
72 Theisen (2012,p. 82) 
73 Theisen (2012,p. 83) 
74 Obala & Mattingly (2013, p. 2736). Based on Kanyinga (2006) and Syagga (2011) I argue that especially the Kikuyu ethnic group has 
been granted highly advantageous influence in political land matters and direct access to land. While not a central hypothesis of this thesis, 
the models will test for the moderating influence of being Kikuyu rather than any other ethnicity. For an overview of ethnic group size at 
national level and reported voting behavior by Ethnic group, see Appendix Chapter 2.61. For ethnic group size by Kenyan Region, see Table 
2.1 (p.30) and Table 2.2 (p.31)  
75 All information presented in the following paragraph is taken from OCHA (2011) and Oxfam (2011) 
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directly affected by the famine.76 Moreover, the drought of 2011 spurred an increase in migration, with over 400 000 
Somali Refugees sheltering in Northern Kenya alone. This migration further strained food and water availability and 
heightened security and health risks.  
Afrobarometer interviews in Kenya were conducted in November 2011, roughly six months after the peak of the famine. 
While the sampling method used in Kenya means that highly remote areas were less likely to be sampled77, the scope of 
the famine can be assumed to have affected the country beyond the Northern and Coastal Areas. 
2.6.2  Method 
 
I use multivariate structural equation modelling to test the hypotheses empirically. This method allows me to gauge, first, 
the validity of refining Homer- Dixon’s model from a two-step model into a multi- step model. Second, the validity of 
framing violence as a function of inter-communal trust, policy satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy driven by 
experienced scarcity at the point of consumption And third, the importance and impact of conditional, meso- level, factors 
which I test using moderator variables. 
The empirical analysis is conducted in four steps. First, following conceptual considerations, questionnaire items are 
collapsed where possible into single variables using Factor Analysis.78 Further, the reliability of each factor is tested using 
Reliability Analysis. The outcomes of the undertaken Factor Analyses are presented in the following section in which I 
discuss the variables of the model. 
Second, ‘initial models’ test the hypotheses presented in the previous section using the full Kenyan sample. The initial 
models enable me to build a causal model linking experienced scarcity with use of violence through secondary variables 
outlined in the conceptual model above. Moreover testing the initial models sequentially allows me to ensure parsimony 
of my revised model. Secondary variables which are found to be expendable or non-fitting to the models will be dropped 
from the initial model and subsequently not be tested in the revised model.  
                                                     
76 OXFAM (2011) 
77 Due to proportional sampling and the strata method chosen, highly remote areas are less likely to be sampled assuming they are less 
populated. In proportion to the sample, only very few interviews were held in such areas. 
78 Throughout my thesis I use Maximum Likelihood method with Direct Oblimin in the Factor analyses. 
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Third, I derive a revised model from the results of the initial model tests. The revised model is then tested for different 
moderator groups, outlined in the following section. This enables me to differentiate valid path models when considering 
varying groups in the data set, as well as assess the effect of conditional factors on the casual linkages between experienced 
scarcity and use of violence. Fourth, I explain possible group differences by introducing additional variables to determine 
what might be causing the perceived group differences.  
The required multivariate of assumptions of linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were tested for all variables 
entered into the initial models. In order to test for possible mediation effects, direct and indirect effects are taken into 
account.I test the initial and revised models in SPSS AMOS. Curve-estimation tests were run for all relations in both 
the initial and revised models and it was determined that all relations were sufficiently linear to be tested using co-
variance based structural equation modeling. Multicollinearity was tested by using the VIF- Collinearity measure in 
linear regression analysis. A threshold of VIF< 3 was deemed to be sufficient to dismiss any issue of collinearity. 
Heteroscedasticity was expected as the revised models were moderated by multi- group moderators. Tests for 
Homoscedasticity were thus not separately run. The inclusion of moderator variables in the revised models resulted in 
different sample sizes for each moderated revised model. The sample size for each model however was deemed 
sufficiently large to allow for structural equation modeling.79 I use Bootstrapping and the Bias- Corrected percentile 
method (Two Tailed significance (BC)) to test the significance of the indirect effects. The model fit of the initial and 
revised models is assessed through the commonly cited model fit indices- CMIN/DF; CFI; and RMSEA. The models are 
considered of adequate fit if the indices meet the thresholds of CMIN/DF < 4; CFI > 0,97 and RMSEA < 0,05. The 
proportion of explained variance in the secondary and dependent variables is tested by Squared Multiple Correlations. 
Little’s MCAR test was run to assess whether missing data could be imputed. However, the test suggested that the 
missing data was not missing at random. To maintain a high percentage of the Kenyan sample and reduce the risk of 
excluding cases based on sensitive question items, I recoded invalid response (‘don’t know; ‘refused’; ‘not applicable’) 
                                                     
79 To proceed with the analysis of a Structural Equation Model the number of data points must either equal (this is referred to a as a 
‘saturated’ or ‘just identified model’ or be greater than the number of parameters to be estimated (this is referred to as an ‘overestimated 
model’). For all models that I tested the models were confirmed to be ‘overestimated’, thus confirming a sufficient sample size.    
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2.6.3  Operationalization 
 
In the following section I present the variables employed in the models of this thesis. All variables are taken or 
computed from the Afrobarometer Round 5 dataset (2011) for Kenya.80   
I selected a dependent variable that indicates respondents’ reported use of violence for a political cause during the 12 
months prior to the interview. Moreover I use five secondary variables reflecting meta- causes outlined by Homer- 
Dixon (1999) as well as (non-resource related) work on political trust and regime legitimacy. The five variables are: (1) 
Policy Satisfaction, (2) Inter- communal trust, (3) Political Trust, (4) State legitimacy and (5) Attitudes towards 
Violence. Additional secondary variables are introduced for individual models in section 3.4.81  
  Dependent Variable 
 
 ‘Use of Violence’ is measured using a question which asks respondents whether they had used force or violence for a 
political cause in the last 12 months.82 High scores indicate that respondents have used violence more frequently while 
low scores indicate that respondents have not and would not use violence for a political cause.  
                                                     
80 For an overview of the variables see Appendix Section 1.1 and 1.2.  
 
81 As these secondary variables are only introduced for specific revised models I will not discuss them in this section. A description for any 
variables introduced at a later stage is given within the respective chapter section. 
82 Question Q26e; Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya. Interviews for Kenya (Round 5) were conducted in November 2011. The 





Figure 2.9: Frequencies of Responses to Q26e: Use of Violence for Political Cause in last 12 months. 
 
From Figure 2.10 it is apparent that most respondents never used violence in the 12 months prior to the survey 
interview. However, examining the use of violence at the national level might hide patterns of violence below the 
national levels or along other indictors. As outlined above, the use of household survey data allows for contrasting of 
sub- groups based on meso- level conditional factors. In the following I will refer to these conditional factors as 
moderators as they are not included in the path models as endogenous or exogenous variables, but rather used to create 













Figure 2.10: Use of Violence mean score by Region and percentage of respondents who report having used violence at least once in the last 12 




Figure 2.11: Mean scores (Use of Violence) percentage of respondents who report having used violence at least once in the last 12 months for 
Urban and Rural Sample. Note that the Use of Violence is coded from zero to four. For better visualization of difference, scale is only shown 
from 0 to 1. 
 
The figures above depict the mean score of the dependent variable and the percentage of respondents who reported to 
have used violence at least once in the 12 months before the interview. In comparison to Figure 5.10, I find that strong 
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violence was especially high in the Eastern Region. Moreover I find that the use of violence appears to be more frequent 
in rural areas.83  
The Afrobarometer Survey for Kenya (2011) allows me to compute moderator groups indicating levels of ethnic 
fractionalization at the sub- national level. As Denny and Walter (2014) state, the majority of all civil wars since 1946 have 
been divided along ethnic lines, rather than lines of class, religion or political ideology.84 Ethnicity, they argue, in the 
context of civil violence, is of heightened relevance for three central reasons.85 First, political leaders are more likely to 
favour their own ethnic groups which causes grievances along ethnic divides. Second, ethnic groups tend to share strong 
ties along linguistic and cultural characteristics, making it easier for them to mobilize support when aggrieved. And third, 
ethnic identities tend to be exclusive and ethnic boundaries closed, making credible commitments more difficult to make 
and hold. What conditions favour ethnic based conflict to actually erupt is addressed by Reynal- Querol (2002). Reynal- 
Querol (2002) argues that contrary to the common claim that ethnic fractionalization makes violence and conflict more 
likely, it is ethnic rivalry between exactly two large ethnic groups competing for dominance that makes violence and 
conflict more likely.86  I use three moderator variables to test for the effect of ethnicity: relative regional ethnic group 
size, absolute regional ethnic group size87, and co-ethnicity with President Kibaki.88 First, ‘relative ethnic group size’ 
draws from Reynal- Querol’s (2002) criticism of the overly simplistic ‘fractionalization leads to conflict’89 argument.  
 
 
                                                     
83 These survey items (Region/ Urban- Rural area) are entered by the interviewer, not the respondent. 
84 64% of all civil wars since 1946. Denny & Walter (2014, p. 199) 
85 Taken from Denny & Walter (2014) 
86 A similar relation was found by Warren & Troy (2015) who find a curvilinear relationship between ethnic group size and propensity to 
violence. Note that this study was undertaken at the national level. 
87 Throughout this thesis I refer to national and regional levels. In this thesis ‘regional level’ or ‘region’ relates to sub- national regions, 
comparable to provinces or states in other countries. The region in the Kenyan example, was the highest administrative unit under the state 
level. Since 2011 a reform has changed the number and size of these regions which needs to be considered if future work were to examine 
time series models. 
88 Ethnic Conflict is a similarly contested field as Environmental or Resource Conflict. Seminal work by Horowitz (1985), Harff & Gurr 
(1989) and Fearon & Laitlin (1996) has been criticized for over-predicting the role of ethnicity on violence and conflict due to selection bias. 
Much debate, as with environmental conflict, can be attributed to weak and limited data availability. For an overview of the literature and 
commonly found data issues in the Ethnic Violence research see Birnir et al (2015). For general discussion see Gilley (2004), Tang (2009) or 
Denny & Walter (2014) 
89 See Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008,p. 186) 
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Table 2.1: Coding of Dual-, Single- and Multi- Ethnic Regions.90 
 
Region Dual-/Single- or Multi- Ethnic Region Ethnic Groups 
    
Nairobi Multi Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba 
Central Single Kikuyu  
Eastern Dual Kamba, Meru -Embu 
Rift Valley Multi 
Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, 
Turkana 
Nyanza Dual Luo, Kisii  
Western Single Luhya  
North Eastern Single Somali  
Coast Dual Mijikenda, Taita 




   
Figure 2.13, depicts the use of violence split by ethnic geometry of the Region. It appears that levels of use of violence 
are higher in dual- ethnic Regions than in single- or multi- ethnic Regions. This indicatively supports Reynal- Querol’s 
argument. Further the Figure suggests that levels of use of violence are similar in single- and multi-ethnic Regions. To 
underline the heightened importance of duality in the context of ethnic violence I computed the moderator as a dummy 
variable which distinguishes between respondents who live in Regions with exactly two large ethnic groups and 
respondents who live in Regions with either a single- dominant ethnic groups or multiple small ethnic groups without 
a dominant group.91 Table 2.1 presents the ethnic composition (‘ethnic geometry’) for each Kenyan Region, as well as 










                                                     
90 See Appendix Tables 2.3- 2.10 for frequency tables for each region 
91 Moderator (‘Relative Ethnic Group Size’) was computed from Q84 (Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya 
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Figure 2.12- Mean Score of dependent variable split by Ethnic Geometry of Region and Respondents who reported to have used violence at 
least once in the last 12 months split by Ethnic Geometry of Region. Note that the scale of the dependent variable runs from 0 to 4. Figure 
has been cropped for better visualization of difference. 
 
In contrast to the ‘relative ethnic group size’ moderator, ‘absolute ethnic group size’ is computed as a dummy variable 
to capture whether a respondent is a member of the largest ethnic group within the sub-national Region or not.92 The 
moderator however does not account for the size of other ethnic groups in the Regions. As Figure 2.14 shows, the 
differences between respondents who are a member of the largest Ethnic group in their Region, and those who are not, 
are small.   
Table 2.2: Largest Ethnic Group by Kenyan Region 
 
Region 
Dominant Ethnic Group 
   
Nairobi Kikuyu  
Central Kikuyu  
Eastern Kamba  
Rift Valley Kalenjin  
Nyanza Luo  
Western Luhya  
North Eastern Somali  
Coast Mijikenda  
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Figure 2.13- Mean Score of dependent variable split by Ethnic Geometry of Region and percentage of respondents who reported to have 
used violence at least once in the last 12 months split by Ethnic Geometry of Region. Note that the scale of the dependent variable runs 





I computed a third moderator, ‘Co-Ethnicity with the President’, as a dummy to distinguish whether or not a respondent 
is of same ethnicity as the Kenyan President in 2011, Mwai Kibaki, who is Kikuyu.93 As Figure 2.15 shows, non- co 
ethnic respondents score higher on the mean score of the use of violence variable and more than twice as many non- 
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Figure 2.14- Mean score of dependent variable and percentage of respondents who reported to have used violence at least once in the last 
12 months split by co- Ethnicity with President. Note that the scale of the dependent variable runs from 0 to 4. Figure has been cropped for 





The Figures above have suggested differences in reported violence when contrasted by meso- level cnditional factors. However 
it is important to gauge how reliable the responses regarding the dependnet variable are. Interview based household survey 
data relies on the responses by interviewees to be as honest and truthful as possible. It is well established however, that 
a range of conditional factors can influence people’s responses when being interviewed. Figures 2.16 and 2.17 address 
two such conditional factors - shared ‘home language’ (first language) between interviewer and interviewee; and 
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Figure 2.15: Mean score of dependent variables and percentage of respondents who reported to have used violence at least once in the last 
12 months split by perceived interview sponsor. Note that the scale of the dependent variable runs from 0 to 4. Figure has been cropped for 






Figure 2.16: Mean score of dependent variables and percentage of respondents who reported to have used violence at least once in the last 
12 months split by shared home language. Note that the scale of the dependent variable runs from 0 to 4. Figure has been cropped for 
better visualization of difference 
 
 
As Figure 2.16 depicts, differences in levels of reported violence emerge once the perceived sponsor of the interview 
is taken into account. Interestingly, respondents who perceived the interview to be government sponsored, reported 
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2.17 shows that the mean score is higher for respondents who are co- linguistic with the interviewer. Moreover the 
Figure shows that the percentage of respondents reporting to have used violence at least once is the same for both 
groups.  
A number of demographic factors might also influence levels of reported violence. Gender, Age and Education are 
commonly used control variables and their impact on social attitudes and behavior is well established. As the Figures 
below show, the level of reported violence does not differ greatly between men and women, but appears to be highest 
for young adults (18- 24) and lower for older respondents. Also, levels of reported violence are highest for respondents 
who had informal schooling only. Interestingly the level of reported violence does not decrease as the level of education 
increases. In fact, reported use of violence increases for respondents with some University education and postgraduate 
education. 
Figure 2.17: Mean score of dependent variables and percentage of respondents who reported to have used violence at least once in the last 
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Figure 2.18: Mean score of dependent variables and percentage of respondents who reported to have used violence at least once in the last 




Figure 2.19: Mean score of dependent variables and percentage of respondents who reported to have used violence at least once in the last 
12 months split by Education. 
 
Overall it appears that while levels of reported violence are low (<10%) for Kenya as a whole, differences emerge once 
the sample is contrasted by meso- level indicators. From the Figures above, the use of violence seems to be high in 
dual- ethnic Regions and rural areas as well as for respondents who are not co- ethnic with President Kibaki. Moreover, 
reported use of violence appears to be especially concentrated in the Eastern Region of Kenya.  
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Use of Violence by Education





The independent variables indicate how often respondents, in the last 12 months, have gone without food and water, 
respectively. I refer to this as ‘experienced scarcity’ or ‘lived scarcity. My independent variables stand in contrast to 
previously applied aggregate or approximated per capita scores used to measure scarcity.  The variables are ordinal with 
response- categories ranging from never to always. I recoded the two variables by collapsing the highest two categories 
indicating frequency of going without food or water into one category.94 To distinguish between natural causes of 
‘experienced scarcity’ and poverty-caused ‘experienced scarcity’ I include a poverty factor (‘wealth scarcity’) as a third 
independent variable.95 The poverty variables ask respondents how often they have gone without medical care, cooking 
fuel and cash income in the last 12 months.96 The poverty factor is included in the path model as an exogenous variable 
and is co- varied with experienced food and water scarcity, respectively.  
 
                                                     
94Conceptually I feel that responding 'always going without food or water' is unlikely. Further the low case number of those responding in 
such category is low.   
95 Poverty or proxies thereof, such as living conditions, have been found to impact people’s dissatisfaction and thereby their propensity to 
rebel or engage in violent behavior. See Boix (2003) for the effects of an accumulative poverty score on satisfaction, Russett (1964), Gurr 
(1974) for living conditions on satisfaction, and Fearon & Laitlin (2003), Hegre & Sabanis (2006) and Murdoch & Sandler (2002) for 
satisfaction on propensity to rebel. All taken from Denny & Walter (2014, pp. 202- 203). 
96 Factor analysis was used to test the validity of collapsing the items (Eigenvalue= 1.281; 42.705% Variance explained) and reliability analysis 




Figure 2.20: Responses for Experienced Scarcity (The figure only indicates valid responses. Missing data has been excluded).  
 
 Secondary Variables97 
 
I selected secondary variables following my research design of framing the effect of experienced scarcity on use of 
violence as function of policy satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy. The secondary variable are rarely found 
in the scarcity- violence literature. 
Policy satisfaction 
 
I employ a factor variable to test policy satisfaction. ‘Policy Satisfaction’ is computed from five variables.98 Respondents 
are asked to evaluate how well or badly the national government is managing the economy, improving living standards 
                                                     
97 For all questionnaire items see Appendix Section 1.1 and 1.2 
98 The five items are taken from the Afrobarometer Survey (Round 5) in Kenya: 1. Q65a. Handling managing the economy; 2. Q65b. 
Handling improving living standards of the poor; 3. Q65c. Handling creating jobs; 4. Q65d. Handling keeping prices down; 5. Q65e. 
Handling narrowing income gaps.Factor analysis was used to confirm the validity of the factor (Eigenvalue= 2.437, 48.747% of variance 








Responses for Scarcity Variables for Kenya, Afrobarometer  
Round 5 
Never Once or Twice Several Times Always
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of the poor, creating jobs, keeping prices down and narrowing income gaps. The factor was coded to have the same 
categories as the questions items, apart from the two highest categories “fairly well” and “well”, which were collapsed 
due to only one respondent in the “well” category. 
 Inter- Communal Trust 
 
I use inter- communal trust as a proxy for societal segmentation which follows directly from Homer-Dixon (1999). The 
question item asks respondents to evaluate their trust in members of other communities.99 The items was not recoded and 




Political Trust is computed from three question items. The first item asks for respondent’s evaluations of trust towards 
the President. The second item asks for evaluations of people’s trust in Parliament, while the third item asks for 
evaluations of trust in the elected local government council. The items are coded for higher scores to indicate higher levels 
of trust and lower scores to indicate lower levels of trust.100 The scale of the factor variable is modelled to reflect the 
range used in the three variables, however no categories were coded. The factor variable runs from no political trust (low 
scores) to a lot of political trust (high scores). 
State Legitimacy 
 
‘State Legitimacy’ is tested using a factor computed from three attitudinal question items. The questions ask for people’s 
agreement or disagreement with obeying court decisions, laws and paying taxes.101 High scores indicate higher agreement 
                                                     
99 Q88d-ken. Trust members of other communities; Taken from Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya 
100 Items used from Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya: Q59a. Trust president; Q59b. Trust parliament/national assembly; Q59e. 
Trust your elected local government council. Factor Analysis (Maximum Likelihood wit Direct Oblimin Rotation) was used to confirm the 
validity of the Factor (Eigenvalue= 1.715 (57.2% variance explained), KMO= 0.636 (significant at p< 0.000)) and Reliability Analysis was 
used to confirm the reliability of the factor (Cronbach’s Alpha= 0.624) 
101 Respondents were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: Q48a. Courts make binding decisions; 
Q48b. People must obey the law; Q48c. People must pay taxes. (Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya). Factor Analysis (Maximum 
Likelihood wit Direct Oblimin Rotation) produced an Eigenvalue of 1.392 (46.391% of variance explained). Reliability Analysis produced a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .710.  
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while low scores indicate disagreement. The scale is computed to run from zero to four without any computed categories. 
Kirwin and Cho (2009) use this exact measure as an indicator of state legitimacy.102 Following Levi (1988) and Englebert 
(2000), Kirwin and Cho (2009) argue that disagreement with such behaviour indicates lower levels of legitimacy, 
affecting the states’ ability to maintain control, generate a tax- income and ensure economic growth.103  
 Attitudes towards Violence 
 
Attitudes towards violence is measured using an attitudinal question item that asks respondents whether violence is never 
justified or can be necessary sometimes.104 Low scores indicate opposition to the use of violence and high scores indicate 
support for the use of violence. 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 
 
The perceived fairness of leaders is tested using a survey item which asks respondents to evaluate whether they feel 
political leaders help everyone or only their own community.105 The use of perceived fairness of elected officials follows 
from Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) who find that high levels of democracy itself do not have a pacifying effect. In 
fact, they argue that societal fractionalization has stronger effects on violence in democracies than in autocracies as 
societal groups are more able to formulate demands and reprimand leaders if these demands are not met.106 The variable 
is coded for higher scores to indicate leaders being perceived more fairly while low scores indicate leaders to be perceived 
as favouring their own community. 
Relative Personal satisfaction 
 
Relative personal satisfaction is tested using a survey questions that asks respondents to evaluate their present living in 
comparison to others.107 Including relative satisfaction echoes a body of work arguing for the heightened role of 
                                                     
102 Note that Kirwin & Cho (2009) do not apply the exact recoding after collapsing of the three items. 
103 Kirwin & Cho 2009: 7 
104 Question Q78; Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya 
105 Q18 (‘Leaders help own community vs. treat all equally’) was selected to reflect this component. (Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya) 
106 This argument is similar to the argument brought forward regarding the inverted U-shaped relation between democracy and conflict 
through inability to intimidate or incorporate. See ‘political satisfaction’ section.  
107 Q4 (‘Your living conditions vs. others’).  
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grievances as a predictor of violence. While the empirical basis of the argument has been found to be non-conclusive in 
some cases, the argument features prominently in several prominent studies108 and shall thus be included in the models. 
The question is coded for higher scores to indicate higher levels of satisfaction relative to others.  
 Control Variables 
 
 
Three control variables are tested in the revised model. Age was recoded from a variable indicating the respondents’ 
age. Age groups were chosen to allow for easier differentiation and interpretation of results. The groups were computed 
to capture respondents with ages of 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 55 and 55 and above as respective age groups. Moreover 
the revised model will be tested while controlling for the effect of gender and education on the dependent variable. 
While gender is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent is male or female, the education variable is ordinal 
with higher item score indicating higher levels of education. Both variables were not recoded.   
 
In this chapter I explored the existing literature on the causal linkages between resource scarcity and violence. I focussed 
on Kenya before examining literature on the role of intermediary and conditional factors. I concluded that much of the 
work undertaken suffered from limited theoretical findings and moreover proved difficult to compare. To aid the theoretical 
reasoning of my thesis I then introduced the work of Homer- Dixon. Homer-Dixon’s work enables me to construct and 
test an empirical model that tests the causal linkages between scarcity and violence in a step- wise and sequential way. 
Following an analysis of Homer- Dixon’s work I critically assessed the current debate and concluded two main limitations 
inherent to many studies: limited data availability and empirical models that test direct linkages between scarcity and 
violence. I then constructed a conceptual causal model linking scarcity and violence which, unlike previous work, is posited 
at the individual level and includes a sequence of intermediary, causally linked, variables which draw from the literature 
on policy satisfaction, political trust, state legitimacy and the occurrence of violence . To test the validity of my conceptual 
                                                     
108 See Stewart (2002), Collier & Hoeffler (2001), Azam (2001), de Soysa et al. (2002), Murshed (2002). Note that Murshed (2002) argues 
that the effect of grievances is particularly strong for non-renewable resources such as oil or diamonds rather than renewable resources such 
as land or water. 
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model I then proposed a sequence of hypotheses. These hypotheses regard the relation between the individual linkages 
within the model. I concluded this Chapter by presenting my research design, the underlying considerations guiding my 
case selection and my operationalization. I provided a technical description of all variables employed in the empirical 
analysis and detailed any coding or computing applied to the questionnaire items. The next Chapter presents the initial 
models in which I test my hypotheses. Using the initial models I derive a revised model, for which I subsequently test 
control and moderator variables. For each moderated revised model I then test sub- models which include additional 






















In this chapter I present the empirical tests of my thesis. I proceed in four steps. First, in section 3.1, I test the hypotheses 
in a sequence of models which increase incrementally in complexity. I will refer to these models as ‘initial models’. 
From these initial models I derive a ‘revised model’ which constitutes a coherent and causal set of linkages between 
experienced scarcity and use of violence. Second, in section 3.2, I compare the revised model to the conceptual model 
outlined in section 2.4. Third, in section 3.3, I test the revised model when moderated by the specified moderator 
variables. Lastly, in section 3.4, I (re-) introduce variables to explain possible differences in the revised model for 


















3.1  Initial Models- Testing of Hypotheses 
In this section I test the hypotheses in order to derive a model which links experienced scarcity and use of violence in 
a sequence of causal intermediary linkages. In this section and the following sections I use figures to depict the output 
of my models. In these figures   significant effects are presented as arrows and significant co- variances are presented 
as double headed arrows. Non- significant effects are not shown. A variable presented in the figure without connecting 
arrows indicates that all direct effects were non-significant. Significant standardized regression weights are shown on 
the respective effects and co- variances. Note that the relative thickness of the arrows is approximate to the strength of 
the effect. The thickness is however merely a visual aid, not an accurate reflection of strength. For the effect size refer 
only to the given standardized regression weights. In all figures the significance level is indicated by asterisks (‘*’- p< 
0.05; ‘**’- p< 0.001; ‘***’- p< 0.000). Moreover the figures present the squared multiple correlations for each 
secondary and dependent variable in the top right corner of the variable box. These squared multiple correlations 
represent the explained variance in the variable explained by the model. The squared multiple correlations can thus be 
interpreted as R² would be interpreted for Regression Models.  
Hypothesis 1 
The first initial model tests the “direct effects” argument which provides the basis for Homer- Dixon’s critique and 
includes no mediating or control variables.109 This model suggests there are significant direct effects of experienced 
food scarcity on violence for the overall sample. The “direct effects” model did not meet the minimal model fit indices 
and should therefore not be interpreted. 
Figure 3.1: Model 1- Direct Effects Model. The model did not meet the minimal model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 0,798, CFI= 1, RMSEA= 0,000); 
N= 2399 




                                                     
109 Note that all models include the Lived Money Scarcity as a co- variate on the Independent Variables. These will not be specifically 
emphasised in the description of the models. 
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A second initial model tests Homer- Dixon’s argument of scarcity enhancing societal segmentation which in turn 
increases the likelihood of violence. To test this argument I use inter-communal trust as a mediator between experienced 
scarcity and use of violence. 
Figure 3.2: Model 2- Initial Model including Trust in Members of other Communities as Meditator between Experienced Scarcity and Use of 










The model however did not meet the minimal model fit indices for both the relation between food scarcity and violence 
and water scarcity and violence.110  
 
To further enquire into the validity of Homer- Dixon’s argument I tested a sub- model. As Homer- Dixon argues, 
societal segmentation arises when scarcity creates sentiments of perceived economic ‘winners and losers’. In the sub-
models I examine whether the non- significant link between experienced personal scarcity and inter- communal trust 




                                                     
110 Model fit indices: Food (CMIN/DF= 1.346; CFI= 1; RMSEA= 0.005), Water (CMIN/DF= 1.163;  CFI= 1; RMSEA= 0.013) 
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Figure 3.3: Model 3- Testing mediation effects of relative satisfaction on Trust in Members of other Communities. Model met the specified 






        






 The question I use to test relative satisfaction asks respondents to evaluate their living conditions versus others.111 This 
item can thus be deemed a proxy for such sense of ‘winners and losers’. I included relative satisfaction as a mediator 
between experienced scarcities and inter- communal trust. However I found no significant mediation effects between 
experienced food scarcity and use of violence. Moreover the sub- model for experienced water scarcity did not meet 
the minimal model fit indices. I therefore reject the second hypothesis as no partial or full mediation was found in 
Model 1 or Model 2. In addition I dropped ‘relative personal satisfaction’ and ‘inter-communal trust’ from the analysis 





                                                     
111 See Section 2.63 
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The fourth initial model tests Hypothesis 3a. I included policy satisfaction as a mediator between experienced food 
scarcity and violence. Indirect effects were tested separately for experienced food and experienced water scarcity.  
Figure 3.4: Model 4- Initial Model including Policy Satisfaction as Meditator between Experienced Scarcity and Use of Violence. The model fit 












Model 4 met the minimal model fit indices.112 Moreover the model confirmed the hypothesis, indicating significant 
partial mediation between experienced food scarcity and use of violence through policy satisfaction.  
Table 3.1: Two Tailed Significance of the Test for significant indirect effects (Model 4). 
 
     




Policy Satisfaction Lived Water Poverty 
  
Policy Satisfaction ... ...   ...     
Use of Violence 0.001 ...  ...    
     
          
 
                                                     
112 CMIN/DF= 3.056; CFI= .997; RMSEA= 0.013 
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The significant negative effects between experienced food scarcity and policy satisfaction and the significant positive 
effects between policy satisfaction and violence moreover confirm the purported positive mediation. Respondents who 
experienced higher levels of food scarcity were less satisfied with government policy, which in turn increased their 
likelihood of engaging in violence. It is important to note that due to the non- satisfactory model fit indices for the first 
two initial models, the significant direct effects in the models should not be interpreted. I therefore interpret full and 
partial moderation effects using the bootstrapping method for Model 4. In a second step I tested the mediation effect 
of policy satisfaction on the relation between Lived Water Scarcity and use of violence. The tested model however did 
not meet the minimal model fit indices. Overall Hypothesis 3a was confirmed by the model for Lived Food Scarcity 
and I found partial mediation through policy satisfaction.  
Hypothesis 3b 
 
In Model 5 (Figure 3.5) I expand on Model 4 by including state legitimacy as a potential mediator between policy 
satisfaction and use of violence. The model met model fit indices.113 The model indicates that the relation between 
experienced food scarcity and violence is partially mediated, however the indirect effects suggest that this mediation 
is only occurring via policy satisfaction but not through state legitimacy. At this point it appears that state legitimacy 
therefore does not mediate the relation between policy satisfaction and use of violence. The direction of the effect state 
legitimacy on use of violence is negative, which supports both the literature on legitimacy as an “appeaser” and 
previous work on the effect of a decline of state legitimacy on violence. I moreover found significant direct effects for 





                                                     
113 CMIN/DF= 2.734; CFI= .998; RMSEA= 0.027 
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Figure 3.5: Model 5- Initial Model including Policy Satisfaction as Meditator between Experienced Scarcity and Use of Violence. The model 















I expand Model 5 by including political trust as a mediator between policy satisfaction and state legitimacy to test 
Hypothesis 3b. The model met the minimal model fit indices114 and I found significant effects between policy 
satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy. I found no support for the hypothesized mediation effect.  
No direct effect was measured between policy satisfaction and state legitimacy. Rather, as presented in Table 3.2 the 
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Figure 3.6: Model 6- Initial Model including Policy Satisfaction as Meditator between Experienced Scarcity and Use of Violence and Political 
Trust as a mediator between Policy Satisfaction and State Legitimacy. The model fit indices were met (CMIN/DF= 2.883; CFI= .996; RMSEA= 















Table 3.2: Test for indirect Effects in Model 6 (Two Tailed Significance (BC) (All - Default model)) 
       
       
 
Lived Food Poverty 
Policy Satisfaction Political Trust State Legitimacy Lived Water Poverty 
Policy 
Satisfaction ... ... ... ... ...  
Political Trust 0.001 ... ... ... ...  
State Legitimacy 0.594 0.001 ... ... ...  
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In an additional step, I re-ran Model 6 excluding the direct path between policy satisfaction and state legitimacy.115 
Table 3.3 presents the indirect effects for that model (Model 6.1). It becomes apparent that not only can the effect of 
policy satisfaction on violence be plotted through political trust and state legitimacy, but the effect of experienced food 
scarcity can be plotted as indirect effects through policy satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy. This indirect 
effect is significant at p< 0,001 as presented in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: Test for indirect effects in Model 6.1 (Two Tailed Significance (BC) (All - Default model)) 
 
  Lived Food Poverty Policy Satisfaction Political Trust State Legitimacy Lived Water Poverty 
Policy Satisfaction ... ... ... ... ...  
Political Trust 0.001 ... ... ... ...  
State Legitimacy 0.001 0.001 ... ... ...  
Use of Violence 0.001 0.001 0.001 ... ...  




Hypothesis 4 concerns the role of attitudes as a pre- condition for behavior. As outlined in the literature review above, 
many studies have failed to test such a linkage. In Hypothesis 4, I proposed that the active use of violence should 
causally be preceded by a positive attitude towards the use of violence.  Model 7 in figure 3.7 supports Hypothesis 4. 
Policy satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy have significant effects on attitudes towards violence which has 
a significant effect on use of violence. While higher levels of political trust and state legitimacy in turn produce more 
negative attitudes towards violence, higher levels of policy satisfaction produces more positive attitudes towards 




                                                     
115 The Model met the minimal model fit indices. CMIN/ DF= 2,669; CFI= .996; RMSEA= 0,026 
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Figure 3.7: Model 7: Initial Model including Attitude towards violence as a pre-condition to use of violence. The model met the model fit 


















I conclude this section by testing Hypothesis 5. The overall model met the model fit indices116 but refuted the proposed 
hypotheses (see Figure 3.7). While I find significant indirect effects linking experienced food scarcity and use of 
violence (see Table 3.3), experienced food scarcity retained a direct significant effect on violence.  
As Figure 3.7 shows, the indirect path through policy satisfaction, political trust and state legitimacy as well as the 
direct path between experienced food scarcity and violence are significant. The indirect path thus does not fully mediate 
the direct effect between experienced scarcity and use of violence, which refutes Hypothesis 5. Before assessing the 
impact of control variables, it is important to assess the coefficients of determination. Overall the amount of the 
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dependent variable’s explained variance is low (6, 5%). 
3.1.1  Control Variables 
 
As I noted in the previous section, the effect of experienced food scarcity on the use of violence can be shown as an 
indirect path through policy satisfaction, political trust, state legitimacy and attitudes towards violence, as well as 
through a direct path between experienced food scarcity and use of violence. Moreover, I conclude that the model has 
only limited explanatory power as measured by explained variance in the dependent variable. To more accurately 
estimate the model value, I tested the effect of control variables. This allows for a more explanatory model and for a 
more accurate assessment of the individual effects of the secondary variables on the dependent variable. 
I controlled for gender, level of education and age but only age had a significant effect.117 The direct effect of age on 
use of violence is negative though comparatively weak in effect size.118  While the model did not meet all the minimal 
model fit indices119 several sources argue that a CMIN/DF ration up to 5 is acceptable.120 Moreover the CMIN/DF ratio 
is not a threshold index. Due to this consideration I will include age as a control on violence in the revised models 
presented in the following section.  
 
3.2  Revised Model 
 
In this section I compare the revised model with the conceptual model. The initial models confirmed a statistically 
significant indirect path between experienced food scarcity and violence through policy satisfaction, political trust, 
state legitimacy and attitudes towards violence. In comparison, the conceptual model included relative satisfaction and 
inter-communal trust as secondary variables. Including these variables, however, produced a model that did not meet 
the minimal model fit indices (see Figure 3.3). Consequently, the two variables were dropped from the model. The 
                                                     
117 The model including age as a control variable met model fit indices. CMIN/DF= 3.927; CFI= 0.979; RMSEA= 0.016 
118 ß= -0,041; SE= 0,011; p< 0,05 
119 CMIN/DF= 5,021; CFI= 0,981; RMSEA= 0,041; N= 2399 
120 See Hooper et al. (2005) for an overview 
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initial models also revealed little support for a possible indirect path between experienced water scarcity and violence. 
In the revised model I therefore only include the experienced water scarcity variable as a co-variate with experienced 
food scarcity along with experienced money scarcity. 
3.3  The Effect of Moderators on the Revised Model  
 
In this section I use the revised model to test meso- level factors which may moderate the causal paths suggested by 
the initial models. Using moderator groups allows me to compare across categories of a single moderator variable. 
Using moderator variables however does not allow for the comparison across the groups of different moderator 
variables. As such, the differences can only be understood in contrast to the other categories of the same variable.121 
The descriptive analysis in section 2.6.3 showed that levels of reported use of violence differ between moderator 
groups. This section thus enquires whether the differences found in the descriptive analysis persist in the causal revised 
model.   
 
3.3.1 Urban and Rural Areas 
The first moderator distinguishes between respondents who live in urban or rural areas. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 present the 
results for the revised model when contrasting for groups differences in the moderator group “urban or rural”.122 The 
revised model shows a number of differences for urban and rural respondents. For both groups a significant indirect 
and direct path exists between experienced food scarcity and violence. However the effect between state legitimacy 
and use of violence is only significant for rural respondents and the effect size between policy satisfaction and violence 
is more than twice as strong in rural areas as it is in urban areas. Moreover the effect size of political trust on state 
legitimacy is almost twice as strong for rural respondents as it is for rural respondents, albeit the direction of the effect 
                                                     
121 This means that respondents in urban areas can be compared to respondents in rural areas, but urban area respondents cannot be compared 
to those who are the same ethnicity as the President. 
122 The revised model met the specified model fit indices. CMIN/DF= 2.986; CFI0.984; RMSEA= 0.029 
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is positive in both cases.  The age group control is only significant for rural respondents.  
Although the differences between the urban and the rural group are mostly non- significant123, it is interesting to note 
that the direct effects between experienced food scarcity and policy satisfaction and between policy satisfaction and 
political trust are larger in urban areas compared to rural ones. The direct effect between experienced food scarcity and 
use of violence is significant and positive for both groups with no significant difference in effect size.  






















Comparing the squared multiple correlations for urban and rural groups suggests that the model explains more variance 
                                                     
123 See Appendix 3.3.1 for test of statistical significance of group differences 
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for the policy satisfaction and political trust variables for urban respondents, and less variance of state legitimacy and 
violence variables. The opposite is the case for rural respondents. This might indicate that experienced food scarcity is 
more strongly ‘politicized’ in urban areas than in rural areas. This intuitively makes sense as those in urban areas more 
likely rely on political processes to ensure the provision of food while those in rural areas have more direct access to 
foods and may not as strongly attribute food provisions to political processes.124  


















Contrarily, the stronger ties between policy satisfaction and use of violence could possibly be explained by a more 
parochial understanding of democratic processes in rural areas. This is further underlined by the stronger effect size 
between political trust and state legitimacy and state legitimacy and violence in rural areas than in urban areas which 
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could indicate a stronger ‘personalized’ notion of state legitimacy for rural respondents in contrast to more ‘abstract’ 
notions of legitimacy for urban respondents.  
It appears that in urban areas the effect of political trust on violence is explained through its indirect effect through 
attitudes towards violence. This is not the case in rural areas. A significant indirect path exists between political trust 
and violence, but not between political trust and attitudes towards violence. Simply put, political trust impacts violence 
indirectly in both urban and rural areas. However, in rural areas the indirect linkage is explained through respondents’ 
decline in perceived state legitimacy which in turn impacts their attitudes towards and use of violence. In urban areas 
political trust also impacts sentiments of state legitimacy, however such sense of legitimacy does not translate into use 
of violence or attitudes towards violence. The only linkage between political trust and use of violence in urban areas is 
thus through the effect political trust has on attitudes towards violence.125  
 
 
3.3.2 Relative Ethnic Group Size 
The second moderator variable, ‘relative ethnic group size’ distinguishes between respondents who live in dual- ethnic 
Regions and respondents who live in either single- ethnic or multi- ethnic Regions.126  
 
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 present the revised model for dual- ethnic and multi- or single- ethnic Regions.  A closer 
examination of the stepwise linkages supports Reynal- Querol’s (2002) argument, with experienced scarcity’s and state 
legitimacy’s effect on violence only being significant in dual- ethnic Regions and the effect being stronger between 
policy satisfaction and violence in dual- ethnic Regions than in single- or multi- ethnic Regions. This is underlined by 
the comparison of the squared multiple correlations. The model accounts for more than seven times more variance in 
the dependent variable in the dual- ethnic Regions than in the single- and multi-ethnic Regions 
                                                     
 
126 Dual ethnic regions are regions with exactly two large ethnic groups. Single ethnic regions are regions with exactly one large or majority 
ethnic group. Multi ethnic regions are regions with several large ethnic groups but no majority ethnic group.  
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Figure 3.10: Revised Model for Dual- Ethnic Sample. The Model met the minimal model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 3,761, CFI= 0,975, RMSEA=  
















Figure 3.11: Revised Model for Single- and Multi- Ethnic Sample. The Model met the minimal model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 3, 761, CFI= 
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The second ethnicity based moderator I test is ‘absolute ethnic group size’. This moderator was computed to indicate 
whether a respondent is a member of the largest ethnic group at the regional level or not. In comparison to the ‘relative 
ethnic group size’ moderator, it does not acknowledge the relative group size of other ethnic groups in the Region.  
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 present the group differences for the revised model when moderated by absolute ethnic group 
size.127 I find few significant differences and significant indirect and direct effects for both groups.128 Moreover the 
proportion of explained variance in the dependent variable is lower and more equal across the two groups when split 
by absolute group size, rather than relative group size. This further supports Reynal- Querol’ s (2002) argument 
Figure 3.12: Revised Model for Largest Ethnic Group in Region Sample. The Model met the minimal model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 3,284, 




















                                                     
127 The model met the minimal model fit indices. CMIN/ DF= 1.927; CFI= .995; RMSEA= 0.020. 
 
128 See Appendix 3.3.11 
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Figure 3.13: Revised Model for Non- Largest Ethnic Group in Region Sample. The Model met the specified model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 















3.3.4 Shared Ethnicity with the President  
The third ethnic moderator, groups respondents who are of same ethnicity as the Kenyan President, Mwai Kibaki 
(Kikuyu ethnicity), and those who are of other ethnicity. As highlighted in the literature review in Chapter 2, Kenya 
has a history of ethnic rivalry and political clientelism which underlines the importance of testing a possible moderation 
effect of co-ethnicity with President Kibaki on the causal path model. 
The revised model met the model fit indices when using co- ethnicity as a moderator.129 Examining Figures 3.14 and 
3.15, differences between the moderator groups become apparent.130 No significant direct or indirect path between 
experienced scarcity and violence could be modelled for co- ethnic respondents.  In contrast, I found significant direct 
and indirect paths for the non- co- ethnic group. Interestingly the effect of policy satisfaction is more strongly linked 
to political trust for co- ethnic respondents than for non-co- ethic respondents. 
 
                                                     
129 CMIN/ DF= 3,940; CFI=. 973; RMSEA= 0. 035 
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Figure 3.14: Revised Model for Sample of Respondents of same ethnicity as President Kibaki. The model met the specified model fit indices 

















Figure 3.15: Revised Model for Sample of respondents who are a different ethnicity as President Kibaki. The Model met the specified model 
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This may point towards sentiments of expected or experienced clientelism based on ethnicity.  
 
In conclusion the revised models above have shown that the causal paths between experienced scarcity and use of 
violence differ significantly when contrasting different sub- samples. While some revised models showed strong 
linkages between experienced scarcity and use of violence (e.g. dual- ethnic Regions), the revised model suggested no 
or weak linkages for other sub- samples, especially for respondents who are the same ethnicity as President Kibaki. 
The importance of meso- level factors on the causal model is moreover emphasized comparing the share of variance 
accounted for in the revised models, respectively.  
As table 3.4 below shows, the revised model varies considerably in its predictive power when contrasting sub- samples. 
For the dependent variable the proportion of explained variance ranges from less than 1 % (same ethnicity as President 
sub sample) to more than 15 % (dual- ethnic Region Sample). 
Table 3.4: Proportion of Variance (Squared Multiple Correlations) in the Secondary and Dependent Variables accounted for by the revised 
model when split by moderator variables. 
 






















   Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,028 0,01 0,044 0,004 0,01 0,028 0,016 0,021 
Political Trust  0,046 0,028 0,014 0,044 0,027 0,039 0,101 0,021 
State Legitimacy  0,007 0,027 0,004 0,029 0,01 0,035 0,013 0,021 
Attitude towards Violence 0,013 0,023 0,029 0,009 0,019 0,014 0,011 0,023 
Use of Violence  0,026 0,098 0,155 0,021 0,07 0,069 0,009 0,081 
                      
 
 
The revised models in this section strongly emphasize the importance of meso level factors on the causal linkages 
between experienced scarcity and use of violence. Moreover the revised models support the need for further 
disaggregation of the applied research design and operationalization in this field of research. This need had been 





3.4  Explaining the Differences 
 
In section 3.3 I found that the revised model performs differently once meso- level factors are included as moderating 
effects. In this section I test additional sub- models in which I seek to explore what causes such differences to appear.  
From the path analyses in the previous section it appears that the differences between the sub- samples grouped by 
absolute ethnic group size are small. For this reason I dropped the ‘absolute ethnic group size’ moderator. In the 
following I thus limit my analysis to the models moderated by ‘urban and rural areas’, ‘relative ethnic group size’ and 
‘co- ethnicity with President Kibaki’.   
3.4.1  Urban / Rural Areas 
 
The revised model in section 3.3 suggests that linkages between experienced scarcity and use of violence are 
particularly important in rural areas and less in urban areas. Additional factors might however underlie such findings 
and help explain such differences. I test two sub- models to gauge more closely what exactly it is about ‘being urban’ 
or ‘being rural’ that possibly causes these differences. I focus on the presence of police and inter-communal trust.  
Adano et al. (2012) argue that weak government presence in remote areas might contribute to rural scarcity induced 
violence. As Figure 3.16 shows for Kenya in 2011, reported police presence is twice as high in urban areas than in rural 
areas.131 
                                                     
131  I use the term ‘reported police presence’ as the variables I employ are based on interviewer experience of police presence in the sampling 





Figure 3.16: Presence of Police Personnel and Police Station in the sampling unit split by Urban and Rural areas.132  
To test the effect of police presence on use of violence, I included the presence of police personnel and having a police 
station in the sampling unit area as exogenous variables with direct effects on the use of violence. Both variables are 
coded as dummy variables to indicate presence or non- presence. The presence of police personnel produced a 
significant negative effect on violence in rural areas133, indicating a deterring effect.134 There was no effect for urban 
areas which supports Adano et al (2012). Including the effect of a police station on use of violence slightly reduced the 
effect size of policy satisfaction and state legitimacy on violence however the effects remain statistically significant.135 
The increase in explained variance in the dependent variable compared to the revised model confirms the validity of 
including such a control factor in the model (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5: Squared Multiple Correlations without control and with control (Police station in sampling unit) 
 
  Urban Area Rural Area 
   No Police Police No Police Police 
       
Political Satisfaction 0.028 0.028 0.161 0.01 
Political Trust  0.046 0.046 0.028 0.028 
State Legitimacy  0.007 0.007 0.027 0.027 
Attitude towards Violence 0.013 0.011 0,023 0,023 
Use of Violence  0.026 0.027 0.098 0.103 
                                                     
132 Note that these conditional items are compiled by the interviewer, not the respondent. Note that both police stations in the sampling unit 
and within walking distance were considered. 
133 (B= -0,058*(SE= 0,033)) 
134 The model met specified model fit indices. CMIN/ DF= 3.125; CFI= .977; RMSEA= 0.030 
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Figure 3.17: Revised Model for Urban Sample including Police Station as a control on use of violence. The Model met the minimal model fit 















Figure 3.18 Revised Model for Rural Sample including Police Station as a control on use of violence. The Model met the minimal model fit 

















Lived Food Poverty 
 
Lived Money Poverty 
 
0,093** 
Lived Water Poverty 
 
Use of Violence 0,116*** 
-0, 166*** 
Policy Satisfaction (Poverty and 
Growth Factor) 
0,087* 0,214*** 
State Legitimacy (Factor) 






Attitude towards Violence 
0,011 
0,046 





Lived Food Poverty 
 
Lived Money Poverty 
 
0,233*** 
Lived Water Poverty 
 
Use of Violence 
0,110*** 
-0, 100*** 
Policy Satisfaction (Poverty and 
Growth Factor) 
0,164*** 0,167*** 
State Legitimacy (Factor) 

















I then tested the direct effect of police personnel in the sampling unit on the use of violence.136 As with police stations, 
the presence of police personnel only had a significant effect in rural areas.137 Moreover the inclusion of the control 
weakened the direct effects of policy satisfaction and state legitimacy on violence. These effects were nonetheless 
statistically significant. The inclusion of police personnel in the model moreover increased the explained variance in 
the dependent variable suggesting its relevance in explaining the use of violence.  
Table 3.6: Squared Multiple Correlations without control and with control (Police personnel in sampling unit). 
Squared Multiple Correlations:   
   Urban Area    Rural Area 
   No Police Police No Police Police 
   Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Political Satisfaction 0.028 0.028 0.161 0.01 
Political Trust  0.046 0.046 0.028 0.028 
State Legitimacy  0.007 0.007 0.027 0.027 
Attitude towards Violence 0.013 0,011 0,023 0,023 
Use of Violence  0,029 0.029 0,098 0,104 
              
 
 
A third sub- model tests the role of inter- communal trust. Inter-communal trust was dropped from the initial models 
as the model did not meet the minimal model fit indices for the full sample. However, Kasara (2013) argues that inter- 
communal trust is higher in densely populated areas due to a higher rate of inter-communal interaction. In less 
populated areas communities are likely to live in ethnically homogenous groups or communities and thus inter- 
communal interaction is assumed to be less. To examine this argument I included trust in members of other 
communities as an exogenous variable with direct effects from inter-communal trust to policy satisfaction, political 
trust and attitudes towards violence. Figures 3.19 and 3.20 present the models for both moderator groups.138 There 
appear to be no significant differences between urban and rural areas regarding the effect of inter-communal trust on 
                                                     
136 The model met the specified model fit indices. CMIN/ DF= 3.078; CFI= .973; RMSEA= 0.029 See Appendix 3.4.6 for Revised Model 
when controlling for the Police Personnel in Sampling Area. 
137 (B= -0,049; SE= 0,033; p< 0,05) 
138 Initially the model was run including age and police station as control variables on use of violence. This model however did not meet the 
minimal model fit indices. For considerations of explaining the differences I decided to drop age from the model. I believe that while age 
does have a significant effect on use of violence in general, it does not further our understanding of why differences between urban and rural 
sub- samples exist.  The model was rerun using only police station as a control in use of violence. The model met the specified model fit 




policy satisfaction and inter-communal trust and political trust, respectively.139 However in both cases the effects are 
significant and positive. This underlines the importance of inter-communal trust in urban and rural areas, but does not 
further the understanding of what exactly it is about being ‘urban’ or being ‘rural’ that explains the different ways in 
which the models performs.  
Figure 3.19: Revised model for Urban Sample testing ‘trust in Members of other communities’ as an endogenous variables to the model. The 






















                                                     






Lived Food Scarcity 
 
Lived Money Scarcity 
 
0,093** 
Lived Water Scarcity 
 




State Legitimacy (Factor) 
Political Trust (Factor) 
0,087 
0,086** 
Police Station the Area 
0,043 
-0,082* 
Attitude towards  
Violence 
0,13*** 











Figure 3.20: Revised model for Rural Sample testing ‘trust in Members of other communities’ as an endogenous variables to the model. The 





















While including inter-communal trust has doubled the explained variance in political trust in urban areas, it has almost 
quadrupled the amount of variance explained in rural areas. This indicates that inter-communal trust is a stronger 
determinant of political trust in rural areas than in urban areas. Even though the explained variance in the use of violence 
remains modest, this finding may suggest the need for further enquiry into the different ways in which political trust is 
derived in urban and rural areas. 
 
The revised models suggest that violence is especially influenced by conditional factors in rural areas and less affected 






Lived Food Scarcity 
 
Lived Money Scarcity 
 
Lived Water Scarcity 
 
Use of Violence 
0,235*** 
Policy Satisfaction (Poverty and 
Growth Factor) 
0,27 *** 
State Legitimacy (Factor) 
0,027 
Political Trust (Factor) 
0,1 










Attitude towards  
Violence 
0,132*** 








Moreover the models suggest that inter-communal trust has a larger impact on the causal paths in rural than in urban 
areas. Although the models remain limited in explaining the variance in the dependent variable, they indicate 
statistically significant differences and thus support disaggregation of the level of analysis and testing of meso- level 
factors.  
 
3.4.2  Relative Regional Ethnic Group Size 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, levels of reported use of violence differ considerably between respondents in ‘dual- ethnic’ 
Regions and those in ‘single-‘or ‘multi- ethnic‘ Regions. I found that these differences between the two types of 
Regions also pertain to the causal path models, which explained more variance in the dependent variable for dual- 
ethnic than for single- or multi- ethnic Regions.  I test two sub- models to explain these differences between the 
moderator groups by examining the role of perceived favouritism of leaders and peoples’ evaluation of their personal 
situation relative to others. 
Figure 3.21: Percentage of respondents who agree or agree strongly with either statement split by relative ethnic group size moderator. 
 
 
To explore the notion of increased competition in dual- ethnic Regions I first ran the revised model including 
perceptions of fairness of leaders as an endogenous variable. The question item asks respondents to evaluate whether 
Do Leaders favor their own Community? 
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they feel leaders treat all equal or whether they feel leaders favor their own community. Figure 3.20 shows that 
respondents in dual- ethnic Regions perceived leaders to treat all equal more often than respondents in single- or multi- 
ethnic Regions, albeit only slightly more. This appears unexpected as, following Reynal- Querol’s (2002) argument, 
ethnic competition should be higher in dual- ethnic Regions which would be expected to reflect in the data as higher 
perceptions of favoritism in such Regions.  I included the variable as a mediator between experienced food scarcity 
and use of violence and between policy satisfaction and use of violence.  
Figures 3.22 and 3.23 presents the revised model for the two moderator groups.140 Direct significant negative effects 
appear to exist between experienced scarcity and perceived fairness and between perceived fairness and violence in 
dual- ethnic Regions. This means that higher perceptions of leader fairness significantly predict lower levels of 
violence. No significant effects exist between perceived fairness of leaders and violence in single- or multi- ethnic 
Regions. In addition, the relevance of perceived fairness is highlighted by comparing the squared multiple correlations. 
The inclusion of perceived fairness has increased the explained variance in the dependent variable for dual- ethnic 











                                                     
140 The model met the minimal model fit indices (CMIN/ DF= 2.721; CFI= .989; RMSEA= 0.027). The model was initially tested including 
the control variables age group, gender and level of education. This model however did not meet the model fit indices. The control variables 
were then included individually, however no model met the model fit indices. 
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Figure 3.22: Revised model split for Dual-Ethnic Region Sample. ’Perceived fairness of leaders’ is included as an endogenous variables 
predicted by Lived Food Poverty and Policy Satisfaction and predicting Attitudes towards and Use of Violence. The model met the specified 
















This suggests competition being stronger and more intense in dual- ethnic Regions. Moreover the negative significant 
indirect effects linking experienced scarcity with the use of violence through perceived fairness point to the heightened 
potential of violence in these Regions if behavior by political leaders is unable to mitigate such effects or actively 










                                                     







Lived Food Scarcity 
 
Lived Money Scarcity 
 
0,260*** 
Lived Water Scarcity 
 
Use of Violence 0,107*** 
-0,210*** 





State Legitimacy (Factor) 



















Figure 3.23: Revised model for Single- and Multi- Ethnic Region Sample. ’Perceived fairness of leaders’ is included as an endogenous variables 
predicted by Lived Food Poverty and Policy Satisfaction and predicting Attitudes towards and Use of Violence. The model met the specified 
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I then included relative satisfaction in the model to assess whether it had an effect on the explanatory value of the 
model. Figure 3.24 displays that a higher percentage of respondents feel they are worse off than others in dual- ethnic 
Regions than in single- or multi- ethnic Regions. This could indicate a stronger sense of ‘winners and losers’ in dual- 
ethnic Regions, a notion described by Homer- Dixon resulting from scarcity and could explain why levels of violence 
are higher in dual- ethnic Regions than other Regions. I included relative satisfaction as being predicted by experienced 
food scarcity and predicting policy satisfaction, political trust and perceived fairness of leaders. 
Figure 3.25: Revised model for Dual- Ethnic Region Sample. ‘Relative Satisfaction’ is included as an endogenous variables to the previous 
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Figures 3.25 and 3.26 display a significant negative effect from Lived Food Scarcity on relative satisfaction for both 
types of Region.  This means that higher levels of experienced scarcity lead to respondent’s feeling they are less well 
off than others. Moreover the figures demonstrate that the effect of such relative satisfaction on policy satisfaction is 
stronger in dual- ethnic than in single- or multi- ethnic Regions. This could indicate experiences being more frequently 
being perceived relative to others in dual- ethnic Regions in comparison to single- or multi- ethnic Regions. In both 
cases relative satisfaction had no significant direct effect on political trust or perceived fairness of leaders. On the whole 
relative satisfaction increased the model’s explained variance in the dependent variable for dual- ethnic Regions but 
not for single- or multi- ethnic Regions which suggests a greater effect in dual- ethnic Regions. 
Figure 3.26: Revised model for Single- and Multi- Ethnic Region Sample. ‘Relative Satisfaction’ is included as an endogenous variables to the 
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The models above tested the possible explanations for the differences between dual- ethnic and single- and multi- 
ethnic Regions. However in the descriptive analysis in Section 2 I found that the use of violence seems to be especially 
high in the Eastern Region, which is a dual- ethnic Region. I thus examined whether the found effects for dual- ethnic 
Regions are caused by the dual- ethnic competition in the Regions or whether these effects are unique to the Eastern 
Region. The figure below distinguishes the use of violence by Eastern Region, other dual- ethnic Regions, and single- 
or multi- ethnic Regions.143 
Figure 3.27: Share of respondents who reported to having used violence at least once in last 12 months. The respondents were grouped by 
Eastern Region, other dual- ethnic Regions and single- and multi- ethnic Regions (Rest of Kenya). Further, respondents were grouped by Urban 




The figure depicts that differences exist in the levels of use of violence when contrasting the Eastern Region and other 
dual- ethnic Regions as well as single- or multi- ethnic Regions. While dual- ethnic Regions show higher levels of 
                                                     
143 Note that the Figure uses a variable that is not the same as the dependent variable used in the models. The variable used here was coded as 
a dummy variable to contrast respondents who never used violence and respondents who used violence at least once. 
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reported violence in comparison to single- and multi- ethnic Regions, differences exist between the Eastern Region and 
other dual- ethnic Regions. This difference is especially large in rural areas. Figures 3.28 and 3.29 test the revised 
model for the Eastern Region and the other two dual- ethnic Regions. The figures clearly suggest that the model 
performs better (explains more variance in the dependent variable) for the Eastern Region than for the other two dual- 
ethnic Regions. This suggests that the effects of ethnic competition I found in the previous models were most likely 
influenced by the case of the Eastern Region. In fact, the model for the other two dual- ethnic Regions (Figure 3.29) 
performs poorly in explaining the variance in the dependent variable (R²= 3,1%). In contrast, the model for the Eastern 
Region (Figure 3.28) performs better than the previous models, explaining almost a quarter of the variance in the 
dependent variable (R²= 23%). This suggests that the found differences in the models above was mainly not due to 
ethnic competition in those Regions, but due to factors unique to the Eastern Region. 
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Figure 3.29: Revised model for Dual- Ethnic Regions (without Eastern Region). The model met the minimal model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 1,853/ 

















Following this finding I limit my further analysis to the Eastern Region. Figures 3.30 and 3.31 present the revised 
model for urban and rural areas within the Eastern Region. The figures indicate that the use of violence within the 
Eastern Region is affected by policy satisfaction, state legitimacy and attitudes towards violence in rural areas, while 
the use of violence is effected only by experienced food scarcity in urban areas. No direct effect exists between 
experienced food scarcity and the use of violence for the rural areas in the Eastern Region. The finding for urban areas 
may support Smith (2014) who argues that African urban areas are especially prone to violence due to food price 
shocks. The low share of explained variance in the dependent variable however indicates that further variables are 
needed to explore Smith‘s (2014) argument. Overall the models explain more variance in the dependent variable for 
rural areas (R²= 23,7%) than in urban areas (R²= 8,7%). The revised model appears to suggest a valid explanation of 
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In rural areas in the Eastern Region the model (Figure 3.30) explains almost 30% of the variance in the dependent 
variable. This indicates that the model is well suited in explaining causes for the use of violence in rural areas in the 
Eastern Region.  
Figure 3.32: Respondents in rural Eastern Region who reported to have used violence a least once in the last 12 months split by perceived 





Moreover no significant effects link political trust to the overall causal model for the rural Eastern Region sample and 
therefore political trust was dropped from the following models. 
Figure 3.32 above displays the responses for the perceived fairness of leaders question for respondents in the rural 
Eastern Region. It appears that the majority perceived leaders to favor their own community. This might influence 
people’s propensity to use violence as a result of experiencing scarcity.  As Figure 3.33 below displays, the inclusion 
of perceived fairness has increased the model performance in explaining the variance in the dependent variable. The 
model accounts for almost 36% of the variance in the dependent variable and displays that significant effects link lived 






Figure 3.33: Revised Model for Eastern Region, Rural Areas including perceived fairness of leaders. The Model met model fit indices 















As would be expected, higher levels of perceived fairness of leaders and higher levels of attributed state legitimacy 
significantly predict lower levels of reported violence, while more positive attitudes towards violence lead to 
significantly higher levels of reported use of violence. The strongest predictor however is policy satisfaction. As I 
found in previous models a significant and positive direct effect exists between the two variables.  
A similar notion of perceived fairness is questioned by the questionnaire item depicted in Figure 3.34. The item asks 
respondents whether they feel that their ethnic group is treated fairly or unfairly.144 However it appears that respondents 
in rural areas in the Eastern Region demonstrate fairly even reported use of violence when split by perceptions of 
fairness of ethnic treatment. For this reason I did not include the item in an additional model. 
The question remains as to what it is about the Eastern Region compared to other Regions that explains the reported 
high levels of use of violence, especially in rural areas. As I showed above, the support I initially found for ethnic 
competition between two large ethnic groups as a cause for violence has been weakened by the subsequent finding that 
dual- ethnic Regions display similar levels of violence as single- or multi- ethnic Regions once the Eastern Region is 
                                                     
144 Question Q85a (Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011) for Kenya) 
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Figure 3.34: Respondents in rural Eastern Region who reported to have used violence a least once in the last 12 months split by perceived 





One notion that is addressed by Homer- Dixon and Blitt (1998) is the need for scarcity induced group rivalry to be 
‘captured’ by a defining entity such as ethnicity, religion or class in order for scarcity to lead to violence or conflict. 
Another plausible entity that is possibly well adept at capturing and instrumentalizing notions of group rivalry are 
political parties. Figure 3.35 displays the levels of political party dominance by Region. I coded ‘party dominance’ to 
indicate the relative  competitiveness within a Region by measuring the ‘distance’ between the levels of support 
between the three largest political parties in the Region, respectively.145 A large value (shown in the figure as a high 
percentage) indicates that the difference in support for the most popular party and the third most popular party is high 
which can be interpreted as low competition.146 
                                                     
145 To compute this variable I used the Kenyan Afrobarometer (Round 5) survey item Q99. 
146 Of course it is feasible that competition can arise between two strong parties without a third competing party. However Figure 3.35 was 
chosen to display the three largest parties as it highlights the especially strong competition in the Eastern Region. 
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Conversely a low score of party dominance (shown in the figure as a low percentage) indicates that the difference in 
support is low which can be interpreted as high competition. Figure 3.35 displays that political party competition is 
especially high in the Eastern Region. In the Eastern Region levels of reported support for the largest party and the 
third largest party differ by only 7%.  It is plausible that the high levels of reported use of violence is thus a reflection 
of the high levels of party competition. I test the effect of partisanship by including a dummy variable which indicates 
support for one of the three largest parties. In the Eastern Region the three largest parties in terms of reported support 
were the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the Orange Democratic Movement- Kenya (ODM-K) and the Party 
of National Unity (PNU). I included the dummy variables as a direct control on attitudes towards violence and the use 





Figure 3.36: Revised model testing the effect of Partisanship (ODM) in Eastern Region, Rural Areas. Model met minimal model fit indices 

















Figure 3.37: Revised model testing the effect of Partisanship (ODM-K) in Eastern Region, Rural Areas. Model met the minimal model fit 
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Figure 3.38: Revised model testing the effect of Partisanship (PNU) in Eastern Region, Rural Areas. The Model met the minimal model fit 
















From the Figures above it appears that identification with specific parties can have substantially different effects on 
the model. In all models the inclusion of partisanship did not weaken the overall model performance as measured in 
the proportion of explained variance in the dependent variable. In the case of the ODM-K and PNU the inclusion of 
partisanship even increased the model performance. Moreover I found no significant direct effect between partisanship 
and use of violence. However I did find differences in the effect of partisanship on attitudes towards violence. Both 
partisanship with the ODM and the ODM- K showed significant effects on attitudes towards violence, while I found 
no significant effect of partisanship with the PNU on attitudes towards violence. Interestingly, the effect of partisanship 
with the ODM on attitudes towards violence is positive while the effect of partisanship with the ODM-K on attitudes 
towards violence is negative. Both effects are significant at p< 0,000 and considerable in size. This indicates that 
partisanship with the ODM increases positive attitudes towards violence while partisanship with the ODM-K decreases 
positive attitudes towards violence. These findings appear to suggest higher willingness to use violence in ODM 
supporters which is in line with the electoral violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 which was principally inflicted by 
ODM supporters.  
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In the Eastern Region high levels of reported use of violence might thus be a result of party competition. More important 
for the analysis of this thesis however is to gauge whether the levels of reported violence in the rural Eastern Region 
were only politically motivated or whether the levels of violence were partially caused or increased by the experience 
of scarcity. I would have liked to run an additional test, in which I moderate the revised model by a variable that 
contrasts ODM, ODM-K and PNU supporters in the Eastern Region. However due to the limited sample size I was 
unable to do so as the group sizes would have been insufficient for using SEM in SPSS AMOS. Future research is, 
however, well advised to test these findings with a larger sample allowing to contrast by partisanship. I further assessed 
the relation between partisanship and experienced food scarcity by re- running the revised model for the Eastern Region 
without experienced food scarcity as an independent variable. However the model did not meet the minimal model fit 
indices. 
Without the possibility of using SEM to test a possible interaction effect between experienced scarcity and partisanship 
on the reported use of violence in the Eastern Region, I ran descriptive analyses to further examine the effect of 
partisanship and experienced scarcity on violence in the Eastern Region.  
Figure 3.39 shows that reported levels of experienced food scarcity are highest for the Eastern Region and the North 
Eastern Region. This could very plausibly be a reflection of the East African drought which heavily affected especially 
the North Eastern Region in the year prior to the interviews being conducted. The figure could also provide descriptive 
indication that heightened levels of experienced food scarcity might have impacted respondents’ propensity to violence 
in the Region. To understand why reported violence was higher in the Eastern Region than the North Eastern Region, 
I compared Figure 3.39 and Figure 3.35. The Figures suggest that political competition might be a catalyst for violence, 
as both Regions experienced similar levels of scarcity, but violence was considerably higher in the Eastern Region. 










To eliminate the possibility that high levels of violence is simply associated with partisanship, but not competition I 
examined levels of use of violence by respondents’ party support across Kenyan Regions. Figure 3.40 indicates that 
partisanship itself seems not to be linked to higher levels of violence. Rather, for all parties, violence is considerably 
higher in the Eastern Region.  To link this finding with levels of experienced scarcity, I split the reported levels of 
violence in the Eastern Region by party affiliation and by experienced scarcity (Figure 3.41). For ODM-K and PNU 
supporters, higher levels of experienced scarcity appear to be associated with higher levels of reported violence. For 
ODM supporters however, reported use of violence is highest for respondents who experienced scarcity several times, 
but lower for respondents who experienced scarcity on a regular basis. This could indicate that for PNU and ODM-K 
supporters, the use of violence is more frequent for those who are highly marginalized, while for ODM supporters, 
moderate levels of experienced scarcity seem to be associated with more frequent use of violence. This may suggest a 
lower ‘threshold’ for ODM supporters to use violence or possibly different electorate demographics for each party.  To 





Figure 3.40: Use of Violence (% of respondents who reported to having used violence at least once in past year) by Region and Party Support. 
 
Figure 3.41: Respondents who used violence at least once in 12 months prior to interview. Respondents are split by Party support. Figure 







Figure 3.42 suggests that the PNU enjoys higher levels of support with respondents who never or very rarely 
experienced food scarcity, while the ODM enjoys higher levels of support with respondents who experienced food 
scarcity more frequently. While this does not suggest that ODM politicized food as a mean of generating support for 
violence, Figures 3.40, 3.41 and 3.42 indicate that the ODM more strongly relied on those who suffered from 
experienced scarcity more frequently and that its supporters were more inclined to using violence.  
Figure 3.42: Party support by experienced food scarcity in Eastern Region (rural areas) 
 
 
These findings could support Homer- Dixon and Blitt (1998) who argue that group issues or grievances translate into 
violence or conflict through the structured and organized ‘harnessing’ of such perceptions by entities such as political 
parties. It is however also plausible that party competition is a result of ethnic competition. High levels of violence in 
the Eastern Region may thus be a result of an incongruence between the number of ethnic groups and the number of 
competing parties. This could explain why the North Eastern Region does not display similar levels of use of violence 
despite its high levels of experienced food scarcity. Figure 3.43 suggests limited support for a strong ethnic linkage 
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between ethnic group and party as party support for the Kamba ethnic group is relatively similar between ODM and 
ODM- K and between ODM and PNU for the Meru/ Embu ethnic group. 
Figure 3.43: Party support split by ethnic group in rural areas in Eastern Region 
 




Similarly, Figure 3.44 displays that use of violence is comparable for Kamba and Meru/Embu ODM supporters while 
larger for Meru/ Embu PNU supporters. This presents no support for a possibly ethnicity driven political motivation of 
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violence, but supports non- ethnic violence along party lines.  The results for ODM-K supporters should be interpreted 
with caution as no Meru/ Embu reported to support the ODM-K.  
 
Overall I found that most of the differences between dual- ethnic and single- or multi- ethnic Regions is accounted for 
by the Eastern Region. Within the Eastern Region, especially rural areas showed high levels of use of violence. In both 
urban and rural areas in the Eastern Region the revised path model met the minimal model fit indices. In both areas the 
model explained a considerable share of variance in the dependent variable. To explain the causes of the high levels of 
reported violence in the rural Eastern Region I re- tested the revised model using perceived fairness of leaders and 
found it added explanatory value to the model. Further I tested for the effect of party competition as the Eastern Region 
is characterized by high levels of party competition.  
I found that partisanship with the ODM produced more positive attitudes towards violence while partisanship with the 
ODM-K decreased positive attitudes, and partisanship with PNU had no effect on attitudes towards violence. I 
moreover found that respondents who reported use of violence most frequently supported the ODM, and that ODM 
supporters who had used violence most frequently had not experienced food scarcity at very high levels, but only at 
moderate levels. I interpreted this finding as indicating that violence by ODM supporters may not be centrally 
determined by experienced scarcity but more strongly by party competition. I moreover found that party competition 
was not merely a reflection of ethnic competition in the Eastern Region, and found no support that ODM members of 
either Kamba or Meru/ Embu were more prone to using violence. 
While the high levels of use of violence in the Eastern Region where most likely caused by party competition, the path 
analysis models presented above emphasize that the propensity to use violence can be modeled as a function of 
experienced food scarcity through multiple secondary linkages with or without party support. The path models or the 
rural areas in the Eastern Region explained approximately 36% of the variance in the dependent variable indicating an 
overall good fit of the model. 
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3.4.3 Co- Ethnicity with President Kibaki  
 
The descriptive tests in Section 2 indicated a difference in levels of use of violence between respondents who are co-
ethnic and respondents who are not co- ethnic with President Kibaki. Moreover the revised model further underlined 
differences between these two groups. To understand whether these differences are caused by the shared ethnicity, I 
tested the relative impact of co- ethnicity on local and national level politics by including the three variables used to 
compute the Political Trust factor in the model. The three political trust variables were included as mediator variables 
between policy satisfaction and state legitimacy. The model was rerun but failed to meet the required model fit indices. 
Using the modification indices in SPSS AMOS, additional paths were drawn. These paths link local level trust with 
national level trust which makes conceptual sense as local politics likely influences people’s perceptions of politics at 
the national level.  
 
Figures 3.46 and 3.47 present the significant effects for the model moderated by co-ethnicity with the President. For 
both groups policy performance does not directly affect trust in the President. Moreover trust in the President is 
predicted by local and national legislative trust for both groups. In the case of non- co-ethnic respondents this effect 
however was significantly stronger than for co-ethnic respondents.147 This could support an argument of non-co- ethnic 
respondents deriving national executive trust from a more ‘holistic’ sense of trust when compared to the co- ethnic 
respondents. This interpretation is supported by state legitimacy being significantly directly affected by all three forms 
of political trust for non-co- ethnic respondents, while only being significantly directly affected by national legislative 
trust for co- ethnic respondents.  
Moreover the squared multiple correlations allow for further interpretation of the differences in the model performance. 
The differences in explained variance are especially indicative in regard to national executive and national legislative 
trust. For co- ethnic respondents the revised model explains a higher percentage of variance in the national legislative 
variable and a lower percentage of variance in the national executive variable. For non- co- ethnic respondents, 
                                                     
147 See Appendix 3.4.48 for Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights 
92 
 
however, the revised model explains a higher percentage of the variance of the national executive variable and a lower 
percentage of variance of the national legislative variable. 
 
Figure 3.45: Revised Model for ‘Kikuyu group’ including threefold differentiation of ‘political trust’ factor and perceived fairness of leaders. 





















This allows for two interpretations. First, policy satisfaction plays less of a role in the generation of trust towards the 
President for respondents who are of the same ethnicity as the President because trust in mainly derived from attributed 
intra- ethnical traits. Or second, respondents who are non-co-ethnic with the President place additional emphasis on 
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on co- ethnicity.  
Figure 3.46: Revised Model for ‘non- Kikuyu Group’ including threefold differentiation of ‘political trust’ factor and perceived fairness of 
leaders. The model met the specified model fit indices (CMIN/DF= 2.297; CFI= .989; RMSEA= 0.023) N= 1881.Squared multiple 
























The results indicate support for the first interpretation and non-support for the second interpretation. The first 
interpretation is supported by the significant effects of perceived fairness on both national legislative trust and national 
executive trust for the co-ethnic group. 
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I found no significant effects between these variables for non-co-ethnic respondents which weakens the second 
interpretation. More importantly however, for the co-ethnic sample, a significant positive effect between perceived 
fairness and national legislative trust and significant negative effect between perceived fairness and trust in the national 
executive (President) exists.148 
Table 3.7: Squared Multiple Correlations for Revised Model in Figure 3.47 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,021 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,032 
Trust in Local Council  0,016 
Trust in National Parliament  0,142 
Trust in President (Kibaki)  0,244 
State Legitimacy  0,024 
Attitude towards Violence  0,031 
Use of Violence   0,095 
    
 
This means that while perceived equal treatment by leaders increases trust in the national legislative body, perceived 
equal treatment by leaders decreases trust in the national executive (President). Considering that no significant effect 
was found for those of different ethnicity than the President, these findings support both the first interpretation made 
above, and the broader notion of expected preferential treatment based on ethnicity by Brubaker (2004). The increase 
in explained variance for trust in the national legislative and executive for the co-ethnic sample group confirms the 
validity of including the variables in the model. 
 
The presented findings point to the importance of co-ethnicity of respondents regarding the linkages between 
experienced scarcity and the use of violence. However, it is not directly apparent if the findings hold for co-ethnics 
regardless of their location or precisely because of their location. To address this limitation I tested a further model in 
which I excluded respondents from the Eastern Region. As elaborated above the Eastern Region shows particularly 
                                                     
148 For a comparison of unstandardized regression weights see Appendix 3.4.48 
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high levels of use of violence, most likely due to political competition between the ODM and the ODM-K. Moreover 
the Eastern Region is a dual- ethnic Region and the majority of respondents from the Eastern Region are not Kikuyu. 
The found differences between co- ethnic and non- co- ethnic respondents might thus be strongly influenced by the 
high levels of violence in the Eastern Region which would be captured by the non- co- ethnic moderator group.  The 
model excluding the Eastern Region met the minimal model fit indices149 and confirmed that the found differences 
were principally unique to the Eastern Region. Excluding the Eastern Region respondents produced a model that 
explained 1 % variance in the dependent variable for co-ethnic respondents and 2,1% explained variance in the 
dependent variable for non- co-ethnic respondents. Considering that the previous model accounted for 9,5% of the 
variance in the dependent model the strong effect of the high levels of violence of the Eastern Region are emphasized. 
Subsequently I did not further test the causes for the differences found in the revised model between co- ethnic and 


















                                                     
149 CMIN/DF= 1,912; CFI= 0,990; RMSEA= 0,021. See Appendix 3.4.53 for model results. 
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4.  Conclusion 
 
 
The study of the effects of natural resource scarcity as a cause or catalyst of violence and conflict has experienced 
growing interest in academia since the early 1990s.150 As ever stronger evidence was produced in the natural sciences 
regarding the scale and scope of the natural effects of climate change, research in the economic and social sciences 
began to investigate what impact such effects might have on the likelihood of violence and conflict around the world. 
Much of this surge in research was undertaken at the system or state level, examining how climate change could affect 
national economic output, food supply or human migration as causes of violence and conflict. While the examination 
of system and state level effects has garnered increasing interest in the past two decades, limited evidence has been 
brought forward in the social sciences regarding the effects of climate change on individuals’ social and political 
attitudes and behaviors. While the literature on climate change mitigation and adaptation has furthered our 
understanding on how people deal with the effects of climate change, research in all fields has produced only limited 
and inconclusive evidence regarding whether people’s social and political attitudes and behavior change too, and 
whether these changes could make violence and conflict more likely. In the introduction to my thesis I thus posed three 
overarching research questions which address this perceived gap in the literature, and motivated and guided this thesis. 
Does scarcity affect people’s propensity to use violence? Are these linkages direct or indirect?  To what extent is 
people’s propensity to use violence induced by scarcity, and to what extent is it dependent upon conditional factors?  
 
Why People Matter: Linking scarcity and violence at the micro- level 
Research on the linkages between scarcity and people’s propensity to use violence has been held back by limited 
availability of data at sub-national levels. Such research has thus commonly failed to account for the role of individual’s 
perceptions and attitudes as a determinant of behavior. I believe that this limitation explains the almost non- existent 
work undertaken to further develop Homer- Dixon’s theoretical work of the late 1990s. Homer- Dixon (1999) argues 
                                                     
150 Brown et al. (2007) 
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that the effects of resource scarcity on violence are primarily indirect through intermediary factors such as economic 
productivity, societal segmentation and institutional functioning and support. His model regards both the macro and 
micro levels, although subsequent research testing Homer- Dixon’s model has been undertaken only at the macro level, 
and has produced limited and often conflicting results. Using the Afrobarometer household survey for Kenya in 2011, 
I tested a causal path model following Homer- Dixon’s notion of indirect rather than direct effects between scarcity 
and violence. In contrast to previous work in this field, I measured both scarcity and violence at the micro level and 
tested the effects between scarcity and violence in a multi- stage path model. The use of micro level data allows me to 
test how ‘experienced scarcity’ is politicized and whether the way in which respondents politicize scarcity makes them 
more prone to using violence. Incrementally testing a multi-stage linkage between scarcity and violence had been 
suggested by Gleditsch and Urdal (2002) and Meierding (2013), and its validity was shown in the findings presented 
in Chapter 3. Theoretically, my multi-stage path model was informed by previous work on policy satisfaction and 
political trust as determinants of state legitimacy, and state legitimacy as a determinant of stability. In my thesis this 
model was referred to as the conceptual model. In the conceptual model, I used measures of experienced food and 
water scarcity as individual variables, which were both co-varied with experienced money poverty to ensure the model 
was not simply measuring poverty as a predictor. As secondary variables I included relative satisfaction, policy 
satisfaction, political trust, perceived fairness of leaders, inter-communal trust, state legitimacy and attitudes towards 
violence in the conceptual model. My dependent variable asks whether, and how frequently respondents had used 
violence for political reasons in the previous 12 months. To test the conceptual model, I derived a set of hypotheses 
which reflect the individual linkages within the conceptual model. Combined, the hypotheses thus fully describe my 
conceptual model.  
 
Experience and Behavior: The direct and indirect effects of experienced scarcity 
In my statistical analysis I proceeded in three steps. First I tested the hypotheses individually using the full Kenyan 
sample. These models were referred to as ‘initial models’. Variables that did not demonstrate significant effects, were 
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dropped. The hypotheses tests allowed me to derive a model that is comprised of significant linkages between 
experienced food scarcity and use of violence, through both direct effects, and through indirect effects through policy 
satisfaction, political trust, state legitimacy and attitudes towards violence. This model was referred to as the ‘revised 
model’ (see Figure 3.47) 















The revised model mostly confirmed a set of causal indirect paths that were conceptually expected. However, I found 
a positive significant effect of policy satisfaction on use of violence, meaning that higher levels of policy satisfaction 
predict higher levels of use of violence. While further research is needed, a possible explanation could be that 
respondents who are more satisfied with policy are more expectant of overall high performance by government, and 
are as a result more willing to express such expectation through active engagement, possibly even violently. Because 
the dependent variable specifically pertains to the use of violence for a political cause and the policy satisfaction 
variable asks for satisfaction regarding poverty alleviation policy, the effect between policy satisfaction and use of 










Lived Money Scarcity 
 
Lived Water Scarcity 
 




Policy Satisfaction (Factor) 
+ + 
State Legitimacy (Factor) 




+ Attitude towards Violence 




politically involved, and as such political violence is more likely to be used by these respondents. In contrast, 
respondents who are dissatisfied with poverty alleviation policy could be assumed to be less wealthy and thus less 
politically involved, making it less likely for these respondents to use violence for specifically political purposes. 
Overall, the revised model for the full Kenyan sample explained 6,9% of the variance in the dependent variable. 
In the initial models I found little evidence of significant effects, both direct and indirect, between experienced water 
scarcity and use of violence. I therefore dropped experienced water scarcity as an independent variable for the revised 
models, and included the variable only as a co-variate to experienced food scarcity. 
 
Tell me who you are, and I’ll tell you what you did? The conditionality of scarcity 
induced violence 
 
In the second step of my analysis, I tested the effects of four moderator variables taken from work on the political role 
of location, ethnicity and patronage in Kenya and Africa as a whole. The moderator variables are: Urban or rural area; 
relative ethnic group size; absolute ethnic group size; and co-ethnicity with the Kenyan President.  
The revised models suggest that significant linkages exist between experienced food scarcity and use of violence, but 
that these linkages are sensitive to conditional factors. As Figure 3.48 shows, the revised models explained substantially 
different amounts of variance for the moderator groups. This indicates that the model is more or less suited in explaining 
the use of violence for certain groups. Using the revised model for the full Kenyan sample to make statements about 
the use of violence in Kenya, would thus either over or underestimate respondents’ propensity to use violence. 
Moreover relying on the national level model would incorrectly simplify and ‘homogenize’ what appear to be strong 





Figure 3.48: Explained variance for moderator groups in the dependent variable in the moderated revised models. 
 
The moderated revised models suggest that experiencing food scarcity is ‘politicized’ more strongly in urban areas 
without translating directly into violence, while respondents in rural areas are more likely to  use of violence as a result 
of experiencing food scarcity and as a result of the indirect effect of secondary variable (Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Overall 
the model explained a larger proportion of variance in the dependent variables for rural respondents (R²= 9,8%)  than 
for urban respondents (R²= 2,6%). Moreover, experienced food scarcity appears to be a strong predictor of violence in 
conditions of ethnic competition at the Regional  level, but not for Regions with one dominant or multiple small ethnic 
groups (Figures 3.10 and 3.11). This supports Reynal- Querol’s (2002) argument of ethnic competition, rather than 
fractionalization being more strongly associated with the occurrence of violence. I found significant effects of 
experienced food scarcity, policy satisfaction and state legitimacy on the use of violence for respondents in dual- ethnic 
Regions, but only between policy satisfaction and use of violence in single- or multi- ethnic Regions. Unlike for the 
urban or rural groups, I found a significant negative effect between policy satisfaction and state legitimacy for dual- 
ethnic Regions, indicating that higher levels of policy satisfaction lead to lower levels of attributed state legitimacy. 
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proportion of variance in the dependent variable for respondents in dual- ethnic Regions (R²= 15,5%), than respondents 
in single- or multi- ethnic Regions (R²= 2,1%). 
The revised models suggest that whether a respondent belonged to the largest ethnic group or not, had little or no 
impact on the respondent’s propensity to use violence. I found only few differences between respondents who were 
members of the largest ethnicity in the Region and those that were not (Figures 3.12 and 3.13). For both groups the 
revised models met the minimal model fit indices and showed significant direct and indirect effects between 
experienced food scarcity and violence. Moreover the model accounted for approximately equal proportions of 
explained variance in the dependent variable (largest ethnic group: R²= 7%; non-largest ethnic group: R²= 6,99%). As 
I found no differenced, I dropped the absolute ethnic group size moderator from further analysis. 
Experienced scarcity appears to be a strong predictor of violence for respondents who are not co- ethnic with the 
President, while co- ethnic respondents’ use of violence appears to be linked to neither experienced scarcity nor the 
secondary factors. For co-ethnic  respondents the moderated revised model (Figure 3.14) failed to produce any 
predictors for the use of violence, while producing significant direct and indirect effects for non- co- ethnic respondents 
(Figure 3.15). For non-co- ethnic respondents the moderated model produced significant positive effects between 
policy satisfaction and use of violence and between attitudes towards violence and use of violence. Moreover, for non-
co-ethnic respondents, perceptions of state legitimacy has a negative effect on use of violence which is in line with the 
broader literature on the appeasing and stabilizing effect of state legitimacy.  
 
Conditionality Matters. But Why? 
In a third step, I re-tested the moderated revised models by including additional variables to gauge more accurately the 
reasons or causes for the group differences in the moderated revised models. 
Additional models regarding the differences between urban and rural groups suggest that lower police presence 
contributes to higher levels of violence in rural areas, albeit only weakly. Supporting Adano et al (2012), police 
presence has a statistically significant negative effect on use of violence in rural areas, but not in urban areas (Figures 
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3.17 and 3.18). Coupled with the findings of Meier et al. (2007), Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) and Raleigh and 
Kniveton (2012) which indicate that violence is linked to strong deviations from the average availability of certain 
renewable resources, these findings could suggest that a temporal increase of government presence during such periods 
may see a substantial lowering of the prevalence of periodical, resource induced violence in those areas. However, the 
models also clearly indicate that sustained experienced food poverty significantly increases the use of violence in both 
urban and rural areas.151 This does not necessarily oppose the findings by Meier et al (2007), Hendrix and Salehyan 
(2012) and Raleigh and Kniveton, but rather complements the findings by noting that absolute scarcity too, can increase 
the potential of violence. Beyond the direct impacts of resource induced violence, the models indicate that a gradual 
erosion of state legitimacy could significantly increase violence in rural areas. In this context, the significant positive 
linkage between inter- communal trust and state legitimacy emphasizes the importance of inclusive rather than 
exclusive policies, if the progressive undermining of state legitimacy in rural areas is to be avoided. 
Additional tests moreover suggest that the differences between respondents living in dual-ethnic Regions and those 
living in single- or multi- ethnic Regions, are mainly caused by conditions unique to the Eastern Region, while the 
models for the two other dual- ethnic Regions were comparable to the single- and multi- ethnic Regions. The tests 
furthermore suggest that high levels of political competition between the largest three parties in the Eastern Region is 
a central cause of the high levels of violence in the Region. I also found that support or opposition of violence was 
affected by what party respondents supported. As such, it appears that support for the ODM party predicts more positive 
attitudes towards violence, while ODM-K support predicts less positive attitudes towards violence, and PNU support 
has no effect on attitudes towards violence. The tests also suggest that partisanship with any of the three parties had no 
significant effect on use of violence. In a series of subsequent descriptive tests, I found that reported use of violence 
was most frequently associated with ODM support, but not with any particular ethnic group. The descriptive tests also 
confirm that the association between ODM support and use of violence is specific to the Eastern Region, and not the 
party in general. What is more, the descriptive tests confirm that levels of use of violence was substantially higher for 
                                                     
151 I use `sustained’ as the question specifically asks for experienced food scarcity during the previous 12 months.  
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the Eastern Region, irrespective of which party respondents were affiliated with. This means that being supportive of 
the ODM, ODM-K or PNU is not associated with more or less frequent use of violence in itself, but being an ODM, 
ODM-K or PNU supporter in the Eastern Region is.  
These findings possibly point towards the continued relevance of the 2007 election, in which the ODM lost in the 
Eastern Region to the PNU. The ODM has repeatedly fostered notions of the 2007 election outcome having been 
unfairly decided against them, and the findings here possibly indicate sustained disappointment on account of the ODM 
supporters. This interpretation would follow Anderson and Mendes (2006), who find that election losers are more likely 
to engage in political protest, especially in new democracies. While the questionnaire item that I use to measure 
violence does not address protest but violence, it is perceivable that Anderson and Mendes’ (2006) notion could extend 
to political violence.152  
 
Figure 3.49: Explained variance in the dependent variable for moderated revised models in dual- ethnic Regions 
Neither the path analyses nor the descriptive tests indicate to what extent partisanship explains the use of violence in 
the rural areas of the Eastern Region.  The path analyses however indicate statistically significant indirect paths between 
                                                     
152 As Moehler (2006) finds, election losers may display higher levels of protests, however election losers are not necessarily less supportive 
of democracy and democratic institutions in general. In fact Moehler (2006) finds that election losers display more critical perceptions of 
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experienced scarcity and use of violence, which in sum account for 35,7% of the variance in the dependent variable. 
Although the squared multiple correlations of the secondary variables indicate that these are instrumental in explaining 
the use of violence, the revised path models emphasizes that experienced (food) scarcity can be asserted to be an 
underlying causal factor in respondents’ propensity to use violence, albeit mostly through its indirect effect on 
secondary factors. A comparison of the share of explained variance in the dependent variable between the model with 
and without partisanship (see Figure 3.49), moreover shows that including partisanship in the model only marginally 
increased the share of explained variance in the dependent variable. This provides only weak support for Homer- Dixon 
and Blitt (1998), who argue that scarcity induced violence tends to be more frequent when grievances or sentiments 
regarding scarcity are captured and instrumentalized by an unifying entity (such as an ethnic group or a political party). 
While the tests suggest that ethnicity did not drive violence, it is important to note that a measure of party membership  
or active participation in a party would be better measures of Homer- Dixon and Blitt’s argument, as voting behavior 
alone may not be sufficient in capturing the underlying dynamics alluded to by the authors. 
Lastly, additional models confirmed that the group differences between respondents who are co-ethnic with the 
President and those that are not, were, to a large extent, caused by the high levels of reported violence in the Eastern 
Region (which is predominantly populated by respondents who are not co-ethnic with the President). I thus refrained 
from further analysis of this moderator. Nonetheless, it appears that being co-ethnic with the President has significant 
effects on the relation between experienced food scarcity and secondary variables, but is not a useful factor to consider 
in explaining the use of violence. While these findings support previous work on ethnicity- based patronage in Kenyan 








The Return of the Belly? Experienced Food Scarcity as a Cause of Violence 
Will we see growing violence as a result of changes in the supply, demand and distribution of renewable resources, 
especially those for human consumption? Will these changes directly trigger violence? What are mid- and long-term 
effects of these changes? And are certain groups more likely to display violence when they experience scarcity? 
Drawing from the discussion above I return to the three research questions presented in the introduction. First, I asked 
whether people who reported having gone without food or water more frequently, reported significantly different levels of 
the use of violence than people who reported having gone without food or water less frequently.  Here, the empirical 
analysis suggests that significant differences exist. However the analysis demonstrated that the relation between 
experienced scarcity and use of violence only exists for food, not water. A possible explanation might be that food is likely 
to be comprised of private ownership goods, i.e. owned by the farmer, the market stall holder or the supermarket. Water 
however might be supplied through communal wells or natural sources from which it is more difficult, or impossible, to 
exclude people. Moreover, habitation is more likely to evolve in the first place where water is available and in constant 
supply. As such, it would be less likely to find large settlements living in areas with insufficient water supply. Of course 
growing scarcity of water could very feasibly have the potential to cause violence in the future, however no evidence was 
found in the models for Kenya in 2011.153 
In the second research question, I asked whether going without food or water had a direct impact on people's propensity to 
use violence, or whether people’s propensity to use violence was mediated by social and political attitudes. My analysis 
presented clear indication that significant linkages exist between experienced food scarcity and use of violence through 
both direct and indirect paths.154 For the full Kenyan sample I found that policy satisfaction, political trust, state legitimacy 
and attitudes towards violence partially mediate the direct effect between experienced food scarcity and use of violence. 
While the findings do not reflect Homer- Dixon’s (1999) exact model (mainly because I did not include most of the ‘social 
                                                     
153 For an overview of literature on the future risks of violence or conflict over water see: Conca (2006) 
154 The models indicate significant direct and indirect effects. It is important to note that this can be interpreted both as indirect effects having 
significant effects on the dependent variable ‘above and beyond’ the direct effect, but also be interpreted as the direct effects being 
significant regardless of the additional attitudinal and behavioral variables included. 
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effects’ proposed by Homer-Dixon), the findings support Homer- Dixon’s conceptual argument of framing and measuring 
the linkage between scarcity and violence as a multi- stage  causal model. 
Moreover the revised models point towards possible mid- and long- term causes of violence. Decreased levels of political 
trust and state legitimacy are especially likely to shift people’s attitudes towards more positive perceptions of violence. 
Low levels of state legitimacy, for some groups, also displayed direct effects on the use of violence. These linkages suggest 
that the experience of scarcity can change people’s perceptions and attitudes not only towards violence, but also the state 
in general. In the mid- to long- term this could weaken the state and make mediation between conflicting groups within 
society more difficult. The models however also clearly suggest that political management can either emphasize or weaken 
these effects. Here, more inclusive policy making by leaders could decrease positive attitudes towards violence and the use 
of violence.  
In the third research question, I asked whether the proposed relation between experienced scarcity and use of violence held 
for all respondents, or whether it was dependent upon meso- level factors, such as ethnicity, political representation and 
place of living. The empirical models suggest significant differences between the moderator groups. I found that meso- 
level factors play a pivotal part in the causal relation between experienced scarcity and the use of violence. As Figure 3.50 
displays, examining the use of violence at the national level gives no indication of use of violence for groups and areas at 
local and regional levels. In fact, using only a measure at the national level would dangerously underestimate the use of 
violence and fail to highlight specific micro- and meso- level drivers of violence. For the case of Kenya, the highest levels 
of violence are found for ODM supporters in the rural areas of the Eastern Region who experienced moderate levels of 
food scarcity. While such a description could accurately be described as Kenya- specific, a broader, more conceptual 
interpretation would note that the highest levels of violence are found amongst respondents who are moderately affected 
by food scarcity, support a party that lost the most recent election (apparently unfairly so too), in a Region that is both 
highly competitive politically and experienced high levels of scarcity. It is precisely this ability to define and specify micro- 
and meso- level groups for which the linkages are strongest that underline the value of positing research on this subject at 
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governance is limited, future research at the local level is advisable. The models have clearly pointed towards the relevance 
of low level governance and previous research has found local level governance to be especially relevant in addressing 
dispute over land- access and land-usage.155 Following such approach would require not only the introduction of new 
variables and the use of alternative data, but require a causal model that acknowledges the causal linkages between local 
experience of scarcity and local political attitudes and perceptions, as well as the linkages between local political 
governance and national governance. Following the presented findings above, the Eastern Region, in particular rural areas 
could prove a valuable first case for deeper scrutiny.  
Of course a number of limitations should be scrutinized by future research on this topic. First, re- testing of the initial 
and revised models across countries and over time is advised. While the models in my thesis are statistically robust for 
Kenya in 2011, the findings may be specific to the case. In this context the changing association between ethnic groups 
and political parties over time could highlight whether experienced scarcity impacts propensity to use violence in 
combination with political partisanship or irrespective of political partisanship. Second, future research should 
emphasize the role of specific staples and goods in regard to the composition of experienced scarcity. Here the 
construction of variables indicating the dependency of a country or sub- national Region on certain staples could prove 
insightful. Such analysis should moreover assess the origins of experienced scarcity to allow for deeper differentiation 
of causal models and provide better understanding for policy makers and researchers alike.  Third, future research 
should attempt to combine both national level and sub- national levels in single models. This could be especially 
interesting in cross-country comparisons and could take the form of nested structural equation models or multi-level 
modelling analysis. In this context a larger sample is necessary as the estimates presented in the models for the Eastern 
Province may be overestimated due to limited cases at the sub-national level. Forth, the dependent variable used in my 
analysis specifically asked respondents about the use of violence for political reasons. From the wording of the question 
it is thus not apparent how, why and when respondents perceived use of violence to have been for political or for other 
reasons. Applying a more differentiated measure to the use of violence may thus be advisable. Moreover the question 
                                                     
155 See Boone (2014) 
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asks the respondent to report only violence used in the past 12 months. It is however difficult to gauge whether 
respondents are able to accurately differentiate such time frames.  Lastly, a cases study approach examining the 
‘politization’ of scarcity prior and during the 2011 election by various political parties and interest groups would have 
allowed for a closer linkage between the perception and experience of scarcity and the use of violence for political 
means, possibly instrumentalized by parties or candidates in the 2011 National Election. In this context scrutinizing 
the role of party- affiliated militia and groups could assist in embedding the empirical findings presented in this thesis, 
in the actual political landscape of Kenya in 2011.156 
 
Overall I can conclude that the research design applied in this thesis has allowed for findings that would not have been 
obtainable with previously applied macro- level analysis. Both the use of a multi- stage structural equation model and the 
application of household- level data has contributed to my analysis tracing the causal linkages more precisely in comparison 
to previous research. The growing availability of relevant household survey data and the findings presented here should 
thus motivate a renewed vigour in this field of research, and hopefully aide the formulation of more valid and robust 
theoretical models. As suggested by the models of this thesis, experiencing scarcity not only affects people’s propensity to 
use violence but also affects their political perceptions and attitudes. While previous research has found limited evidence 
of direct effects of scarcity on violence, an established body of work has suggested how political perceptions and attitudes 
can produce violence and conflict. Further attempts to integrate these two fields of research are thus needed. 
Growing environmental scarcity, whether climate change induced or not, is likely to change the way we live in a myriad 
of ways. Some of these changes may spell violence, especially for those who are already suffering most from scarcity 
today. As I write these final remarks, global leaders are convening at the 2015 Paris COP21 Climate Summit to debate a 
renewed effort to arrest climate change and reduce its effects. It is perhaps time that research too renewed its efforts to 
fully understand what is at stake. Rethinking the ways in which such renewed academic efforts are designed and tested 
could prove to be a valuable first step. 
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Question Number: Q26E 
Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have 
done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause 
Variable Label: Used force or violence for a political cause 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=No, would never do this, 1=No, but would do if had the chance, 2=Yes, once or twice, 3=Yes, 
several times, 4=Yes, often, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 




Experienced Food Scarcity 
 
Question Number: Q8A 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat? 
Variable Label: How often gone without food 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: NDB 
 
Experienced Water Scarcity 
 
Question Number: Q8B 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough clean 
water for home use? 
Variable Label: How often gone without water 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: NDB 
 
Experienced Money Poverty (Factor):  
 
Question Number: Q8C 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Medicines or 
medical treatment? 
Variable Label: How often gone without medical care 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: NDB 
 
Question Number: Q8D 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough fuel to cook your food? 
Variable Label: How often gone without cooking fuel 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 
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998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: SAB 
 
Question Number: Q8E 
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: A cash income? 
Variable Label: How often gone without a cash income 
Values: 0-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 







Relative Personal Satisfaction 
 
Question Number: Q4 
Question: In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Kenyans? 
Variable Label: Your living conditions vs. others 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to 
answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: NDB, Zambia96 
 
Policy Satisfaction (Factor) 
 
Question Number: Q65A 
Question: Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Managing the economy? 
Variable Label: Handling managing the economy 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: SAB 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q65B 
Question: Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Improving the living 
standards of the poor. 
Variable Label: Handling improving living standards of the poor 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
 
Question Number: Q65C 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t 
you heard enough to say: Creating jobs? 
Variable Label: Handling creating jobs 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 




Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
 
Question Number: Q65D 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t 
you heard enough to say: Keeping prices down? 
Variable Label: Handling keeping prices down 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: NDB 
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q65E 
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t 
you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor? 
Variable Label: Handling narrowing income gaps 
Values: 1-4, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: SAB 




Question Number: Q88D_KEN 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Members of other communities? 
Variable Label: Trust members of other communities 
Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don’t know, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Kenya Afrobarometer Round 5 
 
Political Trust (Factor) 
 
Question Number: Q59A 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The 
President? 
Variable Label: Trust president 
Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Zambia96 
 
Question Number: Q59B 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: 
Parliament? 
Variable Label: Trust parliament/national assembly 
Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Adapted from Zambia96 
 
Question Number: Q59E 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Your 
Local Government Council? 
Variable Label: Trust your elected local government council 
Values: 0-3, 9, 998, -1 
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Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Adapted from Zambia96 
 
State Legitimacy (Factor) 
 
Question Number: Q48A 
Question: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The courts have the 
right to make decisions that people always have to abide by. 
Variable Label: Courts make binding decisions 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to 
answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 
Note: The interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q48B 
Question: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The police always 
have the right to make people obey the law. 
Variable Label: People must obey the law 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to 
answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 
Note: The interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Question Number: Q48C 
Question: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: The tax authorities 
always have the right to make people pay taxes. 
Variable Label: People must pay taxes 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to 
answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 
Note: The interviewer probed for strength of opinion. 
 
Attitudes towards Violence 
 
Question Number: Q78 
Question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in Kenyan politics today. 
Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. 
Variable Label: Violence never justified vs. sometimes necessary 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 
4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Ghana Afrobarometer Round 5 




Perceived Fairness of Leaders 
 
Question Number: Q18 
Question: Let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this country. Which of the 
following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: Once in office, elected leaders are obliged to help their home community or group first. 
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Statement 2: Since elected leaders should represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own 
group over others. 
Variable Label: Leaders help own community vs. treat all equally 
Values: 1-5, 9, 998, -1 
Value Labels: 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 
4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data 
Source: Afrobarometer Round2 






Question Number: Q1 
Question: How old are you? 
Variable Label: Age 
Values: 18-110, 998-999, -1 




Question Number: Q97 
Question: What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Variable Label: Education of respondent 
Values: 0-9, 99, 998 -1 
Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary 
school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ high school, 5=Secondary school 
completed/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or 





Question Number: Q101 
Question: Respondent’s gender 
Variable Label: Gender of respondent 
Values: 1, 2 
Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female 
Source: SAB 




Question Number: Q89B 
Question: Which party is that? 
Variable Label: Which party 
Values: 300-318, 9995, 9997-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 300=Orange Democratic Movement Party (ODM), 301= Orange Democratic Movement Party of 
Kenya (ODM-K), 302=Party of National Unity (PNU), 303=National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), 304=NARC 
Kenya, 305=Democratic Party of Kenya (DP), 306=Ford-Kenya (Ford-K), 307=Ford-People (Ford-P), 308=Kenya African National Union 
(KANU), 309=National Party of Kenya (NPK), 310=Shirikisho Party, 311=Ford Asili (Ford-A), 312=Labour Party of Kenya, 313=Safina, 
314=Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADDU), 315=KADDU-Asili, 316=United Democratic Party of Kenya (UDM), 
317=New Ford-Kenya (New Ford-K), 318=G7, 9995=Other, 9997=Not applicable, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don’t know, -1=Missing 
data 






Urban or Rural Area 
 
Question Number: URBRUR 
Question: PSU/EA 
Variable Label: Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit 
Values: 1-2 
Value Labels: 1=urban, 2=rural 
Note: Answered by interviewer 
 
Relative Ethnic Group Size (computed from) 
 
Question Number: Q84 
Question: Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe? 
Variable Label: Tribe or ethnic group 
Values: 300-322, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 300=Kikuyu, 301=Luo, 302=Luhya, 303=Kamba, 304=Kalenji, 305=Kisii, 306=Meru/Embu, 
307=Masai/Samburu, 308=MijiKenda, 309=Taita, 310=Somali, 311=Pokot, 312=Turkana, 313=Tharaka, 314=Teso, 
315=Sabaot, 316=Rendile, 317=Pokomo, 318=Mbeere, 319=Kuria, 320=Borana, 321=Arabic, 322=Oroma, 
9990=Kenyan only or doesn’t think in those terms, 9995=Others, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don't know, - 
1=Missing data 
Source: SAB 
Note: Interviewer entered respondent’s exact response. If respondent did not identify any group on this question – that is, if they “Refused to 
answer” (9998), said “Don’t know” (9999), or “Kenyan only” (9990) – then the 
interviewer marked “Not applicable” for questions Q85A-Q85B and continued to question 85C. 
 
 
Question Number: REGION 
Question: Region/Province 
Variable Label: Province or region 
Values: 300-307 
Value Labels: 300=Nairobi, 301=Central, 302=Eastern, 303=Rift Valley, 304=Nyanza, 305=Western, 306=North 
Eastern, 307=Coast 
Note: Answered by interviewer 
 
Absolute Ethnic Group Size (computed from) 
 
Question Number: Q84 
Question: Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe? 
Variable Label: Tribe or ethnic group 
Values: 300-322, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 300=Kikuyu, 301=Luo, 302=Luhya, 303=Kamba, 304=Kalenji, 305=Kisii, 306=Meru/Embu, 
307=Masai/Samburu, 308=MijiKenda, 309=Taita, 310=Somali, 311=Pokot, 312=Turkana, 313=Tharaka, 314=Teso, 
315=Sabaot, 316=Rendile, 317=Pokomo, 318=Mbeere, 319=Kuria, 320=Borana, 321=Arabic, 322=Oroma, 
9990=Kenyan only or doesn’t think in those terms, 9995=Others, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don't know, - 
1=Missing data 
Source: SAB 
Note: Interviewer entered respondent’s exact response. If respondent did not identify any group on this question –that is, if they “Refused to 
answer” (9998), said “Don’t know” (9999), or “Kenyan only” (9990) – then the 
interviewer marked “Not applicable” for questions Q85A-Q85B and continued to question 85C. 
 
Question Number: REGION 
Question: Region/Province 




Value Labels: 300=Nairobi, 301=Central, 302=Eastern, 303=Rift Valley, 304=Nyanza, 305=Western, 306=North 
Eastern, 307=Coast 
Note: Answered by interviewer 
 
Co-Ethnicity with President 
 
Question Number: Q84 
Question: Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe? 
Variable Label: Tribe or ethnic group 
Values: 300-322, 9990, 9995, 9998-9999, -1 
Value Labels: 300=Kikuyu, 301=Luo, 302=Luhya, 303=Kamba, 304=Kalenji, 305=Kisii, 306=Meru/Embu, 
307=Masai/Samburu, 308=MijiKenda, 309=Taita, 310=Somali, 311=Pokot, 312=Turkana, 313=Tharaka, 314=Teso, 
315=Sabaot, 316=Rendile, 317=Pokomo, 318=Mbeere, 319=Kuria, 320=Borana, 321=Arabic, 322=Oroma, 
9990=Kenyan only or doesn’t think in those terms, 9995=Others, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don't know, - 
1=Missing data 
Source: SAB 
Note: Interviewer entered respondent’s exact response. If respondent did not identify any group on this question –that is, if they “Refused to 
answer” (9998), said “Don’t know” (9999), or “Kenyan only” (9990) – then the 






















































































































































Very Bad Fairly Bad Neither good nor bad

























































































Trust in Local Council






























Trust in National President










































Perceived Fairness of Leaders
Leaders favour their own community
Leaders tend to favour their own community
Leaders tend to favour everyone



























Table 2.1- Frequencies or Urban and Rural respondents 
 
  Urban Rural N 
N 919 1480 2399 
% 38% 62% 100% 
    




0,120 0,162 0,156 0,115 0,099 0,101 0,066 0,11110,1%
23,5%
8,1%




































































































































































Use of Violence by Education















Use of Violence by Gender
Use of Violence Mean Score
Used Violence at least once in last 12 months
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Table 2.2-  Coding of Relative Ethnic Group Size. Computed from Q84, Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011), Kenya. 
   
      
Region Dual-/Single- or Multi- Ethnic Ethnic Groups   
      
Nairobi Multi Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba  
Central Single Kikuyu    
Eastern Dual Kamba/ Meru, Emba  
Rift Valley Multi Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Turkana 
Nyanza Dual Luo, Kisii    
Western Single Luhya    
North Eastern Single Somali    
Coast Dual Mijikenda, Taita   
           























  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Kikuyu 68 27,4 28,6 28,6 
Luo 47 19,0 19,7 48,3 
Luhya 36 14,5 15,1 63,4 
Kamba 35 14,1 14,7 78,2 
Kalenjin 6 2,4 2,5 80,7 
Kisii 9 3,6 3,8 84,5 
Meru / Embu 7 2,8 2,9 87,4 
Maasai / Samburu 2 ,8 ,8 88,2 
Taita 2 ,8 ,8 89,1 
Somali 14 5,6 5,9 95,0 
Pokot 1 ,4 ,4 95,4 
Borana 6 2,4 2,5 97,9 
Arabic 1 ,4 ,4 98,3 
Kenyan only, 
doesn’t think of self 
in those terms 4 1,6 1,7 100,0 
Total 238 96,0 100,0   
 Missing 2 ,8   
Others 7 2,8  
Refused 1 ,4  
Total 10 4,0   






Table 2.4- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: Central Region 
 
 
Table 2.5- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: Eastern Region 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Kikuyu 295 92,2 92,8 92,8 
Luo 2 ,6 ,6 93,4 
Luhya 6 1,9 1,9 95,3 
Kamba 8 2,5 2,5 97,8 
Kalenjin 1 ,3 ,3 98,1 
Kisii 1 ,3 ,3 98,4 
Meru / Embu 3 ,9 ,9 99,4 
Maasai / Samburu 
1 ,3 ,3 99,7 
Somali 1 ,3 ,3 100,0 
Total 318 99,4 100,0   
Missing Others 2 ,6   









  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Kikuyu 3 ,8 ,8 ,8 
Luo 1 ,3 ,3 1,1 
Luhya 4 1,1 1,1 2,2 
Kamba 180 50,0 50,3 52,5 
Kalenjin 1 ,3 ,3 52,8 
Kisii 3 ,8 ,8 53,6 
Meru / Embu 121 33,6 33,8 87,4 
Maasai / Samburu 4 1,1 1,1 88,5 
Mijikenda 1 ,3 ,3 88,8 
Somali 8 2,2 2,2 91,1 
Pokot 1 ,3 ,3 91,3 
Turkana 1 ,3 ,3 91,6 
Tharaka 10 2,8 2,8 94,4 
Rendile 7 1,9 2,0 96,4 
Mbeere 10 2,8 2,8 99,2 
Borana 3 ,8 ,8 100,0 
Total 358 99,4 100,0  
Missing Missing 1 ,3  
Others 1 ,3  
Total 2 ,6  




Table 2.6- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: Rift Valley Region  
     
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Kikuyu 103 17,4 17,6 17,6 
Luo 19 3,2 3,2 20,9 
Luhya 97 16,4 16,6 37,4 
Kamba 13 2,2 2,2 39,7 
Kalenjin 193 32,7 33,0 72,6 
Kisii 18 3,0 3,1 75,7 
Meru / Embu 4 ,7 ,7 76,4 
Maasai / Samburu 47 8,0 8,0 84,4 
Pokot 27 4,6 4,6 89,1 
Turkana 60 10,2 10,3 99,3 
Teso 1 ,2 ,2 99,5 
Sabaot 1 ,2 ,2 99,7 
Borana 2 ,3 ,3 100,0 
Total 585 99,0 100,0  
Missing Missing 3 ,5  
Others 3 ,5  
Total 6 1,0  
Total 591 100,0  
 
Table 2.7- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: Nyanza Region 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
139 
 
Kikuyu 1 ,3 ,3 ,3 
Luo 202 64,7 65,6 65,9 
Luhya 8 2,6 2,6 68,5 
Kamba 2 ,6 ,6 69,2 
Kalenjin 1 ,3 ,3 69,5 
Kisii 78 25,0 25,3 94,8 
Somali 1 ,3 ,3 95,1 
Kuria 15 4,8 4,9 100,0 
Total 308 98,7 100,0  
Missing Others 4 1,3  
Total 312 100,0  
 
 
Table 2.8- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: Western Region 
 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Kikuyu 2 ,8 ,8 ,8 
Luo 12 4,8 4,9 5,7 
Luhya 197 79,4 80,1 85,8 
Kalenjin 2 ,8 ,8 86,6 
Kisii 2 ,8 ,8 87,4 
Taita 1 ,4 ,4 87,8 
Teso 22 8,9 8,9 96,7 
Sabaot 7 2,8 2,8 99,6 
Kuria 1 ,4 ,4 100,0 
Total 246 99,2 100,0  
Missing Others 2 ,8  
Total 248 100,0  
 
 
Table 2.9- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: North Eastern Region 
 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Somali 111 99,1 99,1 99,1 
Arabic 1 ,9 ,9 100,0 
Total 112 100,0 100,0  
Table 2.10- Frequencies of Responses for Q84: Coast Region 
 
 Ethnic Group Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Kikuyu 8 3,8 4,0 4,0 
Luo 15 7,2 7,5 11,4 
Luhya 4 1,9 2,0 13,4 
Kamba 18 8,7 9,0 22,4 
Kisii 4 1,9 2,0 24,4 
Meru / Embu 1 ,5 ,5 24,9 
Maasai / Samburu 1 ,5 ,5 25,4 
Mijikenda 98 47,1 48,8 74,1 
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Taita 25 12,0 12,4 86,6 
Somali 8 3,8 4,0 90,5 
Pokomo 6 2,9 3,0 93,5 
Arabic 5 2,4 2,5 96,0 
Oroma 7 3,4 3,5 99,5 
Kenyan only, 
doesn’t think of self 
in those terms 
1 ,5 ,5 100,0 
Total 201 96,6 100,0  
Missing Others 7 3,4  
 
 
Table 2.11- Frequencies for Relative Ethnic Group Size Moderator 
 
 
  Dual- Ethnic Single-/ Multi- Ethnic N 
N 880 1519 2399 
% 37% 63% 100% 
    




























Figure 2.17- Mean Score of dependent variable split by Relative Ethnic Group Size. Note that the scale of the dependent 













Table 2.12- Frequencies for Absolute Ethnic Group Size Moderator. Computed from Q84, Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011), 
Kenya 
 
    
  Largest Ethnic Group in Region Non-Largest Group in  Region N 
N 1344 1022 2366 
% 57% 43% 100% 
    












Figure 2.18- Mean Score of dependent variable split by Absolute Ethnic Group Size. Note that the scale of the dependent 














Use of Violence Mean Score














Non co- Ethnic 
Respondents N 
N 480 1881 2361 
% 20% 80% 100% 
    












Figure 2.19- Mean score of dependent variable split by co- Ethnicity with President. Note that the scale of the dependent 













Use of Violence Mean Score
















































Use of Violence Mean Score
Largest Ethnic Group in Region Non- Largest Ethnic Group in Region
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Table 3.3.1- Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.8 and 3.9 
 
   Urban  Rural  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,105 0 -0,065 0 1,472 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,275 0 0,21 0 -1,231 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,109 0,009 0,211 0 1,922* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,037 0,476 0,163 0 1,982** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,105 0,008 -0,028 0,359 1,565 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,049 0,111 -0,088 0 -1,018 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,035 0,264 0 0,986 0,898 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,055 0 0,068 0 0,586 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,009 0,526 -0,089 0 -3,818*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,069 0,005 0,214 0 4,254*** 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,001 0,965 -0,037 0,012 -1,692* 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,042 0,009 0,057 0 0,653 
        
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.3.2: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.8 
 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,166 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,214 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,087 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,024 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,09 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,053 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,037 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,118 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,021 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,093 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,001 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,086 
        







Table 3.3.3: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.9 
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   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,1 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,167 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,164 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,114 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,024 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,1 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,11 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,153 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,227 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,062 
Use of Violence <--- Use of Violence 0,087 
    
 
 
Table 3.3.4: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.8 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,01 
Political Trust  0,028 
State Legitimacy  0,027 
Attitude towards Violence 0,023 
Use of Violence   0,098 
    
    
 
Table 3.3.5: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.7 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,028 
Political Trust  0,046 
State Legitimacy  0,007 
Attitude towards Violence 0,013 
Use of Violence   0,026 








   Dual  Multi  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,143 0 -0,043 0,009 3,593*** 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,144 0 0,279 0 2,587*** 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,074 0,078 0,216 0 2,663*** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,177 0 0,071 0,082 -1,785* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,061 0,08 -0,054 0,084 0,151 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,072 0,009 -0,067 0,005 0,148 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,007 0,802 0,006 0,805 -0,023 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,114 0 0,018 0,036 -3,377*** 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,159 0 0,001 0,857 5,922*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,365 0 0,045 0 -7,555*** 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,035 0,152 -0,011 0,184 0,926 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,134 0 0,032 0 -3,129*** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.3.7: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.10 
 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,21 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,12 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,059 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,141 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,059 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,087 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,009 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,133 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,191 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,29 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,044 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,133 







Table 3.3.8: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.11 
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   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,067 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,211 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,17 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,046 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,046 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,072 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,006 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,053 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,005 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,086 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,034 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,096 
    
Table 3.3.9: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.10 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,044 
Political Trust  0,014 
State Legitimacy  0,004 
Attitude towards Violence 0,029 
Use of Violence   0,155 
    
 
Table 3.3.10: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.11 
 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,004 
Political Trust  0,044 
State Legitimacy  0,029 
Attitude towards Violence 0,009 
Use of Violence   0,021 









Table 3.3.11: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.12 and 3.13  














Table 3.3.12: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.12 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,101 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,164 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,098 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,088 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,057 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,085 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,035 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,128 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,101 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,194 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,06 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,069 







Table 3.3.13: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.13 
   Largest  Non Largest  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
        
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,069 0 -0,097 0 -1,074 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,2 0 0,269 0 1,278 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,128 0 0,229 0 1,947* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,131 0,001 0,105 0,024 -0,412 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,07 0,038 -0,057 0,094 0,258 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,079 0,002 -0,069 0,012 0,275 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,036 0,191 0,01 0,712 1,198 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,079 0 0,058 0 -0,915 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,056 0 -0,066 0 -0,438 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,174 0 0,144 0 -0,854 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,035 0,022 -0,008 0,623 1,227 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,042 0,009 0,07 0 1,173 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
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   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,166 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,197 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,187 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,073 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,054 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,079 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,012 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,117 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,128 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,167 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,015 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,118 
    
 
 
Table 3.3.14: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.12 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,01 
Political Trust  0,027 
State Legitimacy  0,01 
Attitude towards Violence 0,019 
Use of Violence   0,07 
    
 
 
Table 3.3.15: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.13 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,028 
Political Trust  0,039 
State Legitimacy  0,035 
Attitude towards Violence 0,014 
Use of Violence   0,069 








Table 3.3.16: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.14 and 3.15  
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   Shared  Different  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,075 0,005 -0,095 0 -0,653 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,44 0 0,184 0 -3,854*** 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,169 0,01 0,172 0 0,053 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,036 0,681 0,16 0 2,094** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,088 0,165 -0,049 0,052 0,57 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,015 0,717 -0,079 0 -1,369 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,067 0,174 -0,019 0,354 -1,614 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,014 0,277 0,079 0 3,472*** 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,001 0,945 -0,087 0 -5,028*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,021 0,326 0,181 0 5,303*** 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,01 0,461 -0,022 0,104 -0,63 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,016 0,161 0,068 0 2,688*** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
        
 
Table 3.3.17: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.14 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,127 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,318 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,116 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,02 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,067 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,017 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,062 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,05 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,003 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,045 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,033 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,064 









Table 3.3.18: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.15 
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   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,144 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,145 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,143 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,116 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,045 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,087 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,021 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,127 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,14 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,192 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,036 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,1 
    
Table 3.3.19: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.14 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,016 
Political Trust  0,101 
State Legitimacy  0,013 
Attitude towards Violence 0,011 
Use of Violence   0,009 
    
 
Table 3.3.20: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.15 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,021 
Political Trust  0,021 
State Legitimacy  0,021 
Attitude towards Violence 0,023 
Use of Violence   0,081 














Table 3.4.1: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.17 and 3.18  
 
   Urban  Rural  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,105 0 -0,065 0 1,472 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,275 0 0,21 0 -1,231 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,109 0,009 0,211 0 1,922* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,046 0,369 0,163 0 1,858* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,104 0,009 -0,028 0,36 1,54 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,05 0,106 -0,088 0 -0,998 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,054 0 0,068 0 0,622 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,01 0,506 -0,087 0 -3,731*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,069 0,005 0,219 0 4,422*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,042 0,009 0,056 0 0,631 
Use of Violence <--- Age 0 0,982 -0,038 0,009 -1,812* 
Use of Violence <--- POLICE STATION 0,021 0,45 -0,073 0,025 -2,187** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
        
 
Table 3.4.2: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.17 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,166 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,214 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,087 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,03 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,089 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,053 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,116 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,022 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,093 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,085 
Use of Violence <--- Age 0,001 
Use of Violence <--- Police Station  0,025 




Table 3.4.3: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.18 
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   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,1 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,167 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,164 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,114 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,024 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,1 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,11 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,15 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,233 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,085 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,064 
Use of Violence <--- Police Station  -0,055 
    
Table 3.4.4: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.17 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,028 
Political Trust  0,046 
State Legitimacy  0,007 
Attitude towards Violence 0,011 
Use of Violence   0,027 
    
Table 3.4.5: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.18 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,01 
Political Trust  0,028 
State Legitimacy  0,027 
Attitude towards Violence 0,023 
Use of Violence   0,103 







Table 3.4.6: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Revised Model including Police Personnel as control on 
use of violence 
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   Urban  Rural  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,105 0 -0,065 0 1,472 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,275 0 0,21 0 -1,231 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,109 0,009 0,211 0 1,922* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,046 0,369 0,163 0 1,858* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,104 0,009 -0,028 0,36 1,54 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,05 0,106 -0,088 0 -0,998 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,054 0 0,071 0 0,801 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,011 0,481 -0,088 0 -3,743*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,07 0,004 0,219 0 4,419*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,042 0,009 0,057 0 0,644 
Use of Violence <--- Age 0,001 0,959 -0,037 0,012 -1,779* 
Use of Violence <--- POLICE PERSONNEL 0,044 0,11 -0,067 0,046 -2,559** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.4.7: Standardized Regression Weights for Revised Model including Police Personnel as control on use of violence 
(Urban Areas) 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,166 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,214 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,087 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,03 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,089 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,053 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,115 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,023 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,094 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,086 
Use of Violence <--- Age 0,002 
Use of Violence <--- Police Personnel 0,052 














Table 3.4.8: Standardized Regression Weights for Revised Model including Police Personnel as control on use of violence 
(Rural Areas) 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,1 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,167 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,164 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,114 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,024 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,1 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,115 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,151 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,233 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,086 
Use of Violence <--- Age -0,062 
Use of Violence <--- Police Personnel -0,049 
    
Table 3.4.9: Squared Multiple Correlations for Revised Model including Police Personnel as control on use of violence (Urban 
Areas) 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,028 
Political Trust  0,046 
State Legitimacy  0,007 
Attitude towards Violence 0,011 
Use of Violence   0,029 
    
 
Table 3.4.10: Squared Multiple Correlations for Revised Model including Police Personnel as control on use of violence (Rural 
Areas) 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction  0,01 
Political Trust  0,028 
State Legitimacy  0,027 
Attitude towards Violence 0,023 
Use of Violence   0,104 









Table 3.4.11: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.19 and 3.20  
 
 
Table 3.4.12: Standardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.19 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,163 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Trust Members of other Communities 0,13 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,186 
Political Trust <--- Trust Members of other Communities 0,207 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,086 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,034 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,08 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,053 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust Members of other Communities -0,041 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,116 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,022 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,093 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,085 
Use of Violence <--- POLICE STATION 0,025 





   Urban  Rural  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,103 0 -0,065 0 1,43 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Trust Members of other Communities 0,09 0 0,089 0 -0,032 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,239 0 0,165 0 -1,433 
Political Trust <--- Trust Members of other Communities 0,185 0 0,23 0 1,276 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,109 0,009 0,211 0 1,922* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,051 0,315 0,17 0 1,881* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,094 0,02 -0,011 0,733 1,629 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,049 0,108 -0,083 0 -0,873 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust Members of other Communities -0,043 0,222 -0,056 0,031 -0,294 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,054 0 0,064 0 0,44 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,01 0,506 -0,088 0 -3,77*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,069 0,005 0,221 0 4,461*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,042 0,009 0,057 0 0,686 
Use of Violence <--- POLICE STATION 0,021 0,451 -0,07 0,034 -2,094** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
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Table 3.4.13: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.20 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,099 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Trust Members of other Communities 0,132 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,131 
Political Trust <--- Trust Members of other Communities 0,27 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,164 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,119 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,009 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,094 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust Members of other Communities -0,058 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,103 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,152 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,235 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,087 
Use of Violence <--- POLICE STATION -0,052 
    
 
Table 3.4.14: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.19 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,043 
Political Trust   0,087 
State Legitimacy  0,007 
Attitude towards Violence  0,013 
Use of Violence   0,027 
    
Table 3.4.15: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.20 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,027 
Political Trust   0,1 
State Legitimacy  0,027 
Attitude towards Violence  0,025 
Use of Violence   0,099 






Table 3.4.16: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.22 and 3.23  
   Dual  Multi  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,143 0 -0,043 0,009 3,593*** 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,138 0,001 0,004 0,905 2,673*** 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,339 0 -0,179 0 2,017** 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,134 0,001 0,283 0 2,834*** 
Political Trust <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,035 0,109 0,021 0,234 1,995** 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,074 0,078 0,216 0 2,663*** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,15 0 0,066 0,108 -1,431 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,069 0,045 -0,053 0,089 0,349 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,062 0,023 -0,065 0,007 -0,071 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,094 0 -0,024 0,257 2,286** 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,092 0 0,016 0,056 -2,695*** 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,15 0 0,002 0,825 5,701*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,327 0 0,044 0 -6,702*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,114 0 0,032 0 -2,516** 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,131 0 -0,004 0,551 5,646*** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.4.17: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.22 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,21 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,11 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,184 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,111 
Political Trust <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,054 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,059 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,12 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,067 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,075 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,138 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,107 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,18 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,26 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,113 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,192 





Table 3.4.18: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.23 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,067 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,003 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,093 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,214 
Political Trust <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,03 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,17 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,042 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,045 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,07 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,029 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,049 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,006 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,085 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,097 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,015 
    
 
Table 3.4.19: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.22 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,044 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,038 
Political Trust   0,017 
State Legitimacy  0,004 
Attitude towards Violence  0,046 
Use of Violence   0,185 
    
 
Table 3.4.20: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.23 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,004 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,009 
Political Trust   0,045 
State Legitimacy  0,029 
Attitude towards Violence  0,01 
Use of Violence   0,019 























Table 3.4.22: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.25 
   Estimate 
Relative Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,358 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,174 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,101 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,123 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Relative Satisfaction -0,039 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,181 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,111 
Political Trust <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,054 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,068 
State Legitimacy <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,114 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,115 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,066 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,076 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,138 
   Dual  Single/ Multi  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Relative Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,414 0 -0,335 0 1,77* 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,118 0 -0,031 0,074 2,953*** 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,059 0,004 0,035 0,031 -0,913 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,154 0 0,006 0,855 2,862*** 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Relative Satisfaction -0,042 0,276 0,007 0,823 0,984 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,332 0 -0,179 0 1,921* 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,134 0,001 0,283 0 2,834*** 
Political Trust <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,035 0,109 0,021 0,234 1,995** 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,085 0,044 0,215 0 2,461** 
State Legitimacy <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,094 0 0,054 0,014 -1,138 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,143 0 0,063 0,127 -1,369 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,068 0,049 -0,053 0,09 0,323 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,063 0,022 -0,065 0,007 -0,064 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,094 0 -0,024 0,256 2,273** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,021 0,383 0,026 0,278 0,141 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,09 0,002 0,016 0,078 -2,498** 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,15 0 0,002 0,82 5,672*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,327 0 0,044 0 -6,692*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,114 0 0,032 0 -2,518** 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,131 0 -0,004 0,552 5,618*** 
Use of Violence <--- Relative Satisfaction -0,004 0,863 -0,001 0,873 0,11 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
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Attitude towards Violence <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,029 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,105 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,179 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,259 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,113 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,191 
Use of Violence <--- Relative Satisfaction -0,006 
    
 
Table 3.4.23: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.26 
   Estimate 
Relative Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,316 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,048 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,058 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,005 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,006 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,093 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,214 
Political Trust <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,03 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,169 
State Legitimacy <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,062 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,04 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,045 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,07 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,029 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Relative Satisfaction 0,028 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,047 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,006 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,085 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,097 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,015 
Use of Violence <--- Relative Satisfaction -0,004 
    
Table 3.4.24: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.25 
   Estimate 
Relative Satisfaction 0,128 
Policy Satisfaction 0,053 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,039 
Political Trust   0,017 
State Legitimacy  0,017 
162 
 
Attitude towards Violence  0,049 
Use of Violence   0,193 
    
Table 3.4.25: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.26 
   Estimate 
Relative Satisfaction 0,1 
Policy Satisfaction 0,007 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,009 
Political Trust   0,045 
State Legitimacy  0,033 
Attitude towards Violence  0,011 
Use of Violence   0,019 
    
Table 3.4.26: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.28 and 3.29 
   Eastern  Dual  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,183 0 -0,16 0 0,47 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,037 0,417 0,226 0 2,391** 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,181 0,048 0,096 0,024 -0,846 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,171 0,005 0,169 0,004 -0,02 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,063 0,363 -0,076 0,06 -0,157 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,058 0,145 -0,063 0,125 -0,084 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,147 0,008 0,031 0,218 -1,887* 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,221 0 -0,037 0,179 3,496*** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,512 0 0,143 0 -4,508*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,245 0 0,033 0,272 -3,194*** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.4.27: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.28 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,23 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,043 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,104 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,147 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,048 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,076 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,125 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,229 
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Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,347 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,193 
    
 
Table 3.4.28: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.29 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,257 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,154 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,098 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,126 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,083 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,067 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,055 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,058 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,157 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,048 
    
 
Table 3.4.29: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.28 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,053 
Political Trust   0,002 
State Legitimacy  0,011 
Attitude towards Violence  0,03 
Use of Violence   0,23 
    
Table 3.4.30: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.29 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,066 
Political Trust   0,024 
State Legitimacy  0,01 
Attitude towards Violence  0,025 
Use of Violence   0,031 





Table 3.4.31: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.30 and 3.31 
   Eastern Rural  Eastern Urban  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,216 0,000 -0,112 0,097 1,210 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,008 0,874 0,208 0,051 1,831* 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,197 0,082 0,170 0,258 -0,146 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,243 0,000 -0,025 0,861 -1,688* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust 0,028 0,724 -0,232 0,105 -1,592 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,070 0,095 0,010 0,922 0,743 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,235 0,000 -0,085 0,298 1,561 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,622 0,000 0,098 0,414 -3,59*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,289 0,000 0,084 0,334 -1,792* 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,070 0,341 0,190 0,013 1,130 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.4.32: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.30 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,216 0,054 -4,024 *** 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,008 0,051 -0,159 0,874 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,197 0,113 1,74 0,082 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,243 0,065 3,732 *** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust 0,028 0,079 0,353 0,724 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,07 0,042 -1,672 0,095 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,235 0,051 -4,611 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,622 0,083 7,463 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,289 0,074 3,92 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,07 0,074 0,952 0,341 
       
Table 3.4.33: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.31 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,175 
Political Trust <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,204 
State Legitimacy <--- Political Trust 0,12 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,019 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Trust -0,176 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,01 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,106 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,085 
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Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,099 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,258 
    
Table 3.4.34: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.30 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,056 
Political Trust   0 
State Legitimacy  0,011 
Attitude towards Violence  0,058 
Use of Violence   0,297 
    
 
Table 3.4.35: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.31 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,031 
Political Trust   0,042 
State Legitimacy  0,014 
Attitude towards Violence  0,032 
Use of Violence   0,087 
    
 
Table 3.4.36: Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.33 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,216 0,054 -4,028 *** 
Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,432 0,105 -4,132 *** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,206 0,066 3,108 0,002 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,134 0,038 -3,497 *** 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,292 0,093 -3,15 0,002 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,226 0,05 -4,496 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,539 0,082 6,554 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,239 0,073 3,272 0,001 
Use of Violence <--- Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,187 0,047 -3,95 *** 
       
 
Table 3.4.37: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.33 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,238 
Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,247 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,185 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,212 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,188 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,224 
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Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,342 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,168 
Use of Violence <--- Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,207 
    
 
Table 3.4.38: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.33 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,056 
Political Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,061 
Attitude towards 
Violence  0,099 
State Legitimacy  0,035 
Use of Violence   0,355 
    
 
Table 3.4.39: Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.36 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,216 0,054 -4,028 *** 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,43 0,101 -4,251 *** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,214 0,065 3,291 *** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,133 0,038 -3,525 *** 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,292 0,093 -3,15 0,002 
Attitude towards Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM) 0,312 0,105 2,957 0,003 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,227 0,05 -4,531 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,553 0,084 6,562 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,228 0,076 3 0,003 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,193 0,047 -4,091 *** 
Use of Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM) 0,011 0,136 0,081 0,936 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,052 0,072 0,729 0,466 
       
 
Table 3.4.40: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.36 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,238 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,25 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,193 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,207 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,188 
Attitude towards Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM) 0,213 
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Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,225 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,351 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,161 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,211 
Use of Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM) 0,005 




Table 3.4.41: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.36 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,056 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,063 
Attitude towards Violence  0,145 
State Legitimacy  0,035 
Use of Violence   0,357 
    
  
Table 3.4.42: Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.37 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,216 0,054 -4,028 *** 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,43 0,101 -4,251 *** 
PARTISANSHIP (ODM-K) <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,005 0,05 -0,102 0,919 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,218 0,066 3,32 *** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,134 0,038 -3,522 *** 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,292 0,093 -3,15 0,002 
Attitude towards Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM-K) -0,243 0,118 -2,068 0,039 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,234 0,05 -4,679 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,522 0,082 6,356 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,255 0,074 3,419 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,194 0,047 -4,117 *** 
Use of Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM-K) 0,17 0,146 1,168 0,243 
       
 
Table 3.4.43: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.37 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,238 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,25 
PARTISANSHIP (ODM-K) <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,008 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,196 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,208 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,188 
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Attitude towards Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM-K) -0,152 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,231 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,331 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,179 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,211 
Use of Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (ODM-K) 0,075 
    
 
Table 3.4.44: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.37 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,056 
PARTISANSHIP 
(ODM-K)   0 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,063 
Attitude towards Violence  0,125 
State Legitimacy  0,035 
Use of Violence   0,363 
    
Table 3.4.45: Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.38 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,216 0,054 -4,028 *** 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,43 0,101 -4,251 *** 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,202 0,066 3,067 0,002 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,137 0,038 -3,564 *** 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,292 0,093 -3,15 0,002 
Attitude towards Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (PNU) -0,115 0,112 -1,03 0,303 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,236 0,05 -4,709 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,532 0,082 6,509 *** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,227 0,073 3,097 0,002 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,196 0,047 -4,159 *** 
Use of Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (PNU) -0,168 0,135 -1,247 0,212 
       
 
Table 3.4.46: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.39 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,238 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,25 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,182 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,212 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,188 
Attitude towards Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (PNU) -0,077 
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Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,233 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,338 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,159 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,213 
Use of Violence <--- PARTISANSHIP (PNU) -0,079 
    
 
Table 3.4.47: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.39 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,056 
PARTISANSHIP (PNU)   0 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,063 
Attitude towards Violence  0,104 
State Legitimacy  0,035 
Use of Violence   0,364 
    
 
 
Table 3.4.48: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.46 and 3.47  
   Same  Different  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,075 0,005 -0,095 0 -0,653 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,047 0,436 -0,066 0,017 -1,696* 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,047 0,645 -0,325 0 -3,358*** 
Trust in Local Council <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,542 0 0,206 0 -3,709*** 
Trust in Local Council <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,036 0,326 0,008 0,71 1,037 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Trust in Local Council 0,409 0 0,356 0 -1,094 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,375 0 0,127 0 -2,828*** 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,086 0,013 0,034 0,079 -1,307 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in Local Council 0,124 0,01 0,241 0 2,202** 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,186 0 0,364 0 3,428*** 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,004 0,966 0,03 0,391 0,283 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,081 0,025 -0,037 0,051 1,087 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,19 0,048 -0,082 0,02 -2,66*** 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,005 0,924 0,052 0,03 0,825 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,136 0,011 0,076 0,002 -1,016 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in Local Council -0,028 0,606 0,054 0,022 1,38 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,019 0,832 0,138 0 1,656* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in Local Council -0,039 0,443 0,006 0,77 0,819 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in National Parliament -0,072 0,152 -0,028 0,204 0,789 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,03 0,526 -0,026 0,231 -1,073 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,063 0,198 -0,023 0,264 -1,621 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,012 0,773 -0,072 0 -1,278 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,022 0,562 -0,065 0 -2,097** 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,012 0,346 0,071 0 3,153*** 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0 0,973 -0,081 0 -4,695*** 
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Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,02 0,344 0,162 0 4,656*** 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,009 0,338 -0,064 0 -4,89*** 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,016 0,162 0,062 0 2,404** 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
 
Table 3.4.49: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.46 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,127 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,036 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,021 
Trust in Local Council <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,288 
Trust in Local Council <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,043 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Trust in Local Council 0,395 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,193 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,098 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in Local Council 0,128 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,199 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,002 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,099 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,095 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,004 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,132 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in Local Council -0,027 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,01 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in Local Council -0,04 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in National Parliament -0,076 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,03 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,059 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,013 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,027 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,043 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,002 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,044 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,044 





Table 3.4.50: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.47 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,144 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,055 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,178 
Trust in Local Council <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,127 
Trust in Local Council <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,009 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Trust in Local Council 0,359 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,078 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,038 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in Local Council 0,234 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,352 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,018 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,04 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,054 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,057 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,081 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in Local Council 0,058 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,1 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in Local Council 0,007 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in National Parliament -0,033 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) -0,031 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,026 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,079 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,086 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,114 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,131 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,172 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,124 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,091 
 
 
Table 3.4.51: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.46 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,016 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,002 
Trust in Local Council  0,085 
Trust in National Parliament  0,245 
Trust in President (Kibaki)  0,086 
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State Legitimacy  0,031 
Attitude towards Violence  0,015 
Use of Violence   0,01 
    
 
 
Table 3.4.52: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.47 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,021 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,032 
Trust in Local Council  0,016 
Trust in National Parliament  0,142 
Trust in President (Kibaki)  0,244 
State Legitimacy  0,024 
Attitude towards Violence  0,031 
Use of Violence   0,095 
    
Table 3.4.53: Comparison of Unstandardized Regression Weights for Figures 3.46 and 3.47 without Eastern Region 
   Same  Different  
   Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,073 0,006 -0,083 0 -0,295 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,046 0,447 -0,015 0,633 -0,894 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,037 0,721 -0,277 0 -2,777*** 
Trust in Local Council <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,553 0 0,238 0 -3,389*** 
Trust in Local Council <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,03 0,408 0,007 0,755 0,863 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Trust in Local Council 0,411 0 0,38 0 -0,632 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,366 0 0,124 0,002 -2,669*** 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,085 0,015 0,049 0,026 -0,867 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in Local Council 0,12 0,013 0,258 0 2,545** 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,192 0 0,385 0 3,649*** 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,008 0,922 0,083 0,031 0,801 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,081 0,024 -0,025 0,232 1,345 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,186 0,055 -0,043 0,258 -2,198** 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,005 0,919 0,089 0 1,452 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,135 0,013 0,022 0,406 -1,881* 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in Local Council -0,025 0,648 0,09 0 1,889* 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,014 0,876 0,136 0 1,55 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in Local Council -0,041 0,42 -0,003 0,889 0,669 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in National Parliament -0,074 0,138 -0,02 0,426 0,972 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,034 0,479 -0,019 0,452 -0,974 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,068 0,167 -0,041 0,09 -1,982** 
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Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,011 0,799 -0,079 0,001 -1,413 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,024 0,521 -0,053 0,008 -1,807* 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,012 0,346 0,023 0,039 0,636 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0 0,966 -0,009 0,43 -0,597 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,021 0,336 0,062 0 1,505 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,009 0,326 -0,013 0,168 -1,665* 
Use of Violence <--- Attitude towards Violence 0,016 0,168 0,035 0,003 1,135 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Table 3.4.54: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.46 without Eastern Region 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,124 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,035 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,016 
Trust in Local Council <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,294 
Trust in Local Council <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,036 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Trust in Local Council 0,397 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,188 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,097 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in Local Council 0,124 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,205 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,005 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,099 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,092 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,005 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,13 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in Local Council -0,024 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,008 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in Local Council -0,042 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in National Parliament -0,079 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,034 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,063 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,012 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,03 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,043 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy 0,002 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,045 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,045 




Table 3.4.55: Standardized Regression Weights for Figure 3.47 without Eastern Region 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,126 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,012 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,152 
Trust in Local Council <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,139 
Trust in Local Council <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,008 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Trust in Local Council 0,381 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,073 
Trust in National Parliament <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,053 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in Local Council 0,252 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,375 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,048 
Trust in President (Kibaki) <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,026 
State Legitimacy <--- Policy Satisfaction -0,029 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) 0,104 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in National Parliament 0,025 
State Legitimacy <--- Trust in Local Council 0,102 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,095 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in Local Council -0,004 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in National Parliament -0,024 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Trust in President (Kibaki) -0,023 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity -0,043 
Attitude towards Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,083 
Attitude towards Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,067 
Use of Violence <--- Lived Food Scarcity 0,053 
Use of Violence <--- State Legitimacy -0,02 
Use of Violence <--- Policy Satisfaction 0,095 
Use of Violence <--- Perceived Fairness of Leaders -0,035 










Table 3.4.56: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.46 without Eastern Region 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,015 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,001 
Trust in Local Council  0,088 
Trust in National Parliament  0,245 
Trust in President (Kibaki)  0,088 
State Legitimacy  0,03 
Attitude towards Violence  0,016 
Use of Violence   0,01 






Table 3.4.57: Squared Multiple Correlations for Figure 3.47 without Eastern Region 
   Estimate 
Policy Satisfaction 0,016 
Perceived Fairness of Leaders 0,023 
Trust in Local Council  0,019 
Trust in National Parliament  0,159 
Trust in President (Kibaki)  0,288 
State Legitimacy  0,034 
Attitude towards Violence  0,027 
Use of Violence   0,021 
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